Jonathan Henry Leonard & Ors v Margaret Rose Leonard & Ors

A will may be validly made by a person with dementia, but testamentary capacity is transaction-specific. The court must assess whether the testator understood the nature and effect of the particular will, the general extent of the property disposed of, the relevant moral claims, and whether a disorder of the mind affected the disposition.

Complexity, unexplained inconsistencies, cognitive impairment and failures in the will-making process may establish real doubt as to capacity. The rule in Parker v Felgate applies only where the earlier instructions were given with capacity, the will implements them, and the testator understood its execution. Knowledge and approval require a holistic assessment of whether the will represents the testator’s intentions.

The claimants, Dr Jack Leonard’s four children, challenged the validity of his 2015 Will and sought probate of his 2007 Will. The challenge concerned testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval. Jack had executed the 2015 Will at home, without professional supervision, after a lengthy and complex drafting process conducted by a chartered tax adviser.

The 2015 Will materially changed the distribution of his estate, including provision for his second wife and her family, a life interest trust, hotchpot provisions and treatment of property in the United States and France. The central issues were whether Jack had capacity on 28 October 2015, whether the rule in Parker v Felgate assisted the defendants, and whether he knew and approved the contents.

1. Capacity. The court applied the four-limb test in Banks v Goodfellow. The medical and factual evidence established real doubt as to capacity, so the burden lay on the defendants, although the decision was reached on the evidence as a whole.
2. Jack understood in general that he was making a will and had a general idea of his property and the claims of relevant beneficiaries. He nevertheless could not understand the nature and effect of the complex 2015 Will. He could not understand the trust structure, the power to apply capital, the revocation provisions, or the interaction between those provisions and the treatment of the United States property.
3. The fourth limb of Banks v Goodfellow is separate from the first three and concerns whether a disorder of the mind prevented a just and rational disposition. Jack’s dementia caused the irrational and detrimental treatment of Andrew’s position and the United States property. That was sufficient to establish failure of the fourth limb.
4. The rule in Parker v Felgate did not apply. Jack lacked capacity when he gave the alleged final instructions on 2 July 2015; the 2015 Will did not implement those instructions; and there was no evidence that, when signing, he understood that he was executing a will for which he had given instructions.
5. The defendants also failed to prove knowledge and approval. The circumstances were suspicious, including Jack’s dementia, the absence of professional assistance at execution, inconsistencies between his instructions and the final will, and unexplained provisions which had not been discussed with him. The court adopted a holistic assessment rather than a rigid two-stage inquiry.
6. The court pronounced in favour of the 2007 Will and against the force and validity of the 2015 Will. The parties were invited to agree the consequential order.