EB v Haughton

In a late personal-injury claim arising from alleged childhood sexual abuse, the court must assess all the circumstances under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980. Particular weight may be given to the cogency of the evidence, the reasons for delay and any evidential or forensic prejudice to the defendant. Loss of a limitation defence is not itself the relevant prejudice. A claim may proceed where the allegations were previously reported, the defendant had a fair opportunity to investigate them, and the delay has not materially impaired the defence. Liability is determined on the balance of probabilities, with the seriousness of the allegation informing the strength of evidence required. Aggravated damages are not automatic for sexual abuse or breach of trust and must not duplicate compensation already included in general damages.

The claimant alleged that the defendant sexually assaulted her in 1993, when she was aged 10 or 11. The claim was issued on 16 December 2009, after the primary limitation period had expired. The defendant denied the assaults and had been acquitted of related criminal charges in 2006, although he had previously pleaded guilty to a similar indecent assault on another child.

The issues were whether time should be extended under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, whether the assaults were proved, and the appropriate damages. The court considered the effect of A v Hoare and the authorities on evidential prejudice in delayed sexual-abuse claims.

1. Limitation. The claim fell within the three-year regime in section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980, subject to discretionary disapplication under section 33 following A v Hoare. The relevant prejudice was evidential or forensic prejudice, not the loss of a limitation defence.
2. In exercising the section 33 discretion, all the statutory factors had to be considered. Particular weight was given to the cogency of the claimant’s evidence, the reasons for delay and the defendant’s ability to investigate and defend the allegations. The claimant’s evidence and supporting complaints were cogent. The defendant had known of the allegations, in substance from 1994 and specifically from 2005, and no material evidence had been lost. Although the delay after February 2008 was insufficiently explained, the defendant would suffer little or no prejudice. The limitation period was therefore disapplied under section 33.
3. Liability. The court assessed each allegation separately on the balance of probabilities. The seriousness and unusual nature of the allegations were relevant to the strength of evidence required, but did not impose a different standard of proof. All three categories of assault were proved.
4. The defendant’s conviction for a strikingly similar indecent assault was admissible under section 11(2) of the Civil Evidence Act 1968. It provided some support for the claimant’s account, although the court would have found the principal allegation proved without relying on the conviction.
5. Causation and damages. The sexual abuse was the principal cause and trigger of the claimant’s continuing mental-health problems, although her difficult childhood also contributed. General damages of £28,000 and special damages of £3,640 were awarded. Aggravated damages were refused: the defendant’s abuse of trust did not automatically justify such an award, and compensation for mental distress was already reflected in general damages.
6. Judgment was entered for the claimant in the sum of £32,293, including interest.