Mehta v R.

A conspiracy requires a shared unlawful design. Similar but separate dishonest arrangements do not suffice. However, an indictment alleging a broader conspiracy may support a conviction where the evidence proves that two alleged conspirators made a common agreement within the charged period and object, even if its scope is narrower than alleged and another alleged conspirator is acquitted.

The safety of the conviction depends on whether the accused suffered practical prejudice from the way the case was put. A court should not uphold a sentence based on a broader conspiracy than the one properly proved.

The appellant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of conspiracy to defraud NatWest Plc through fraudulent unsecured-loan applications. His co-accused, Kullar, was acquitted. The prosecution also relied on Murphy, who had pleaded guilty to fraud in relation to transactions connected with the appellant.

The appellant contended that, after Kullar’s acquittal, the evidence could not sustain the wider conspiracy alleged. He accepted that the evidence could support a dishonest agreement between himself and Murphy concerning the Murphy-related loan applications. The central issue was whether that narrower agreement sustained the conviction on the existing indictment and whether any unfairness made the conviction unsafe.

Decision

1. The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The court held that there was no proper evidential basis for a finding that the appellant conspired with unidentified members of his entourage, staff, or those who produced false payslips. The prosecution had left those alleged participants vague and their roles unexplored.

2. There was, however, compelling evidence that the appellant and Murphy had a dishonest agreement concerning the Murphy-related loan applications. The jury’s verdict necessarily meant that it was sure of that agreement. It was not a realistic possibility that the jury convicted solely on the unsupported basis of unknown conspirators.

3. A conspiracy requires a common unlawful purpose or shared design. It does not arise from similar but separate designs. An umbrella agreement may generate further agreements involving additional parties, but persons involved only in separate subsidiary agreements do not thereby become conspirators with each other.

4. Here, the proven agreement between the appellant and Murphy was narrower than the prosecution’s alleged agreement involving Kullar, but it remained an agreement between two alleged conspirators, within the period and object of the indictment. It therefore fell within both the language of the indictment and the case advanced at trial. No substituted alternative verdict was required.

5. The court explained that Barnard (1980) 70 Cr App R 28 concerned a materially different agreement and prejudicial evidence. It did not establish a rule that a narrower proved conspiracy can never sustain a conviction under a broader allegation.

6. Although the indictment and directions had been unsatisfactory, the appellant knew throughout that he had to meet the allegation of a dishonest arrangement with Murphy. He had suffered no injustice from the conviction. The court nevertheless granted leave to appeal against sentence because the sentencing judge had treated the conspiracy as extending beyond the transactions properly proved.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2012] EWCA Crim 2824, dismissed the appeal against conviction and granted leave to appeal against sentence.
• Central Criminal Court: HH Judge Wide QC convicted the appellant of conspiracy to defraud on 29 November 2011 and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment on 1 December 2011.