Serious Fraud Office v Papachristos & Anor

A conspiracy requires a shared unlawful purpose. It does not require every conspirator to know every product, participant or means by which the common design will be carried out. A single conspiracy may therefore be proved on a narrower factual basis than that alleged, provided the common purpose remains within the charge.

A late additional count which merely restates the same offence on a narrower factual basis is unnecessary. It does not render a conviction unsafe unless it causes injustice. Sentencing parity requires a materially similar starting point for defendants of comparable culpability, absent a sound basis for distinction.

The applicants, senior employees of Innospec, were tried at Southwark Crown Court for conspiracy to corrupt Indonesian public officials in connection with contracts for Innospec products, including tetraethyl lead (TEL). At the end of the evidence, the prosecution added a second count confined to TEL.

The jury acquitted both applicants on the wider count but convicted them on the TEL-only count. Papachristos appealed against conviction. Kerrison appealed against conviction and his four-year sentence.

The central issue was whether the evidence disclosed a wider conspiracy and a legally separate TEL-only sub-conspiracy, or one conspiracy capable of proof on either a wider or narrower factual basis.

1. The court dismissed both appeals against conviction. It allowed Kerrison’s appeal against sentence to the limited extent of substituting three years’ imprisonment for four years.

2. A conspiracy depends on a shared common purpose or design. There may be umbrella agreements and distinct sub-conspiracies, as illustrated by R v Coughlan and Young (1976) 63 Cr App R 33. The question is whether there are distinct agreements, rather than differing levels of knowledge about the execution of one agreement. A conspirator may have a narrower understanding of the agreed means, or know fewer participants, yet still share the charged common purpose.

3. On the evidence, there was one conspiracy. Count 1 could be proved on the wider basis of corruption concerning Innospec products including TEL, or on the narrower basis of corruption concerning TEL alone. The reference to Innospec’s products was not a material averment requiring proof that an individual conspirator knew that corruption extended beyond TEL. Count 2 did not allege a separate conspiracy or a different offence.

4. The addition of count 2 under section 5(1) of the Indictments Act 1915 was lawful in isolation but unnecessary and distracting. It caused neither applicant injustice. The evidence remained admissible and each applicant had a proper opportunity to meet the TEL allegation. The jury’s conviction of Papachristos on count 2, despite the judge’s contrary direction that it depended on conviction on count 1, was explicable and safe. That direction lacked logic because count 2 was designed for a TEL-only conviction.

5. Kerrison’s conduct was prolonged and serious corruption, but the judge wrongly selected a five-year starting point. His culpability was broadly comparable to that of Jennings, another chief executive who continued inherited corruption, for whom the correct starting point had been four years. Applying the same 12-month allowance for personal mitigation produced a sentence of three years. The statutory release consequences of a sentence were irrelevant to fixing the proper term.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Dismissed both applicants’ challenges to conviction. Allowed Kerrison’s sentence appeal to the limited extent of quashing four years’ imprisonment and substituting three years.
• Southwark Crown Court: The jury acquitted both applicants on the wider conspiracy count and convicted them on the TEL-only conspiracy count. Papachristos received 18 months’ imprisonment and Kerrison received four years’ imprisonment.