Nigel Rush and Anor v R

For a conspiracy under section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977, the criminal agreement concerns the course of conduct which, if carried out as intended, would necessarily involve an offence. The prosecution must prove the conspiracy as charged, but need not prove that every conspirator knew the precise mechanics by which the criminal purpose would be achieved. A defendant need not personally perform, or actively participate in, the substantive offence. It is sufficient to prove that, when joining the agreement, the defendant intentionally agreed to partake in the criminal purpose and intended that the agreed course of conduct would be carried out. The scope of the conspiracy and the necessary directions depend on the indictment.

Following a large VAT fraud, the appellants were convicted at Southwark Crown Court on 26 July 2024 of conspiracy to cheat the public revenue. The prosecution case was that a broad conspiracy used several trading strands, including genuine metals trading and fictitious VOIP transactions, to enable WNL to retain VAT through false returns. Convictions from an earlier trial were admitted in evidence.

Rush appealed his conviction. Leighton renewed his application for leave to appeal. Both argued that the jury had been misdirected about the scope of the agreement and the mental element required for participation. Rush also argued that the jury should have been allowed to consider a separate, narrower metals-trading conspiracy.

1. Rush’s appeal dismissed. Leighton’s renewed application for leave to appeal refused. Both convictions were safe.
2. Section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 criminalises the agreement itself. The agreed course of conduct need not have begun or been completed. If pursued in accordance with the parties’ intentions, it must necessarily amount to or involve an offence by at least one party, although that party need not be the defendant: paras [47]-[48].
3. The indictment charged a broad conspiracy to cheat the revenue by dishonestly inducing or facilitating false VAT returns. The prosecution therefore had to prove the conspiracy as charged, including that it encompassed metals trading, but did not have to prove that every participant knew the precise method of retaining the VAT, namely the off-setting of fictitious VOIP input tax: paras [49]-[53].
4. The judge was entitled to prevent Rush’s counsel from inviting the jury to speculate that Rush had joined a different, narrower conspiracy. His defence statement denied membership of any conspiracy, and there was no positive evidential case supporting the alternative theory. The admission of the Trial 1 convictions was consistent with the final directions, which properly required the jury to consider whether the broad conspiracy included metals trading: paras [54]-[55].
5. As to Leighton, section 1 does not require proof that the defendant intended personally to take an active part in carrying out the substantive offence. The required mental element is directed to intentionally agreeing to partake in the criminal purpose. No further participation in executing the agreement need be proved. The judge’s directions, read as a whole and with the route to verdict, adequately conveyed that requirement: paras [56]-[59].

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): [2026] EWCA Crim 442. Rush’s conviction appeal was dismissed and Leighton’s renewed application for leave to appeal was refused.
• Southwark Crown Court: On 26 July 2024, Rush and Leighton were convicted of conspiracy to cheat the public revenue. They were sentenced on 25 October 2024. No sentence appeal was brought.