Hunt v Times Newspapers Ltd

In a libel action, freedom of expression and protection of reputation are competing interests. Neither Article 10 nor a general public-interest defence operates as a trump card. The court must apply established domestic principles or balance the competing interests according to the legal framework engaged.

A defence of justification must identify the facts relied on with sufficient precision to enable the claimant to know the case to be met. Serious allegations of criminal conduct require particularisation comparable to an indictment. A defence based on reasonable grounds to suspect must plead primary facts objectively capable of giving rise to suspicion and must not reverse the burden of proof. A Reynolds defence requires particulars showing responsible journalism, including proportionate investigation and verification; the repetition of rumours is insufficient.

The claimant brought a libel claim against the defendant newspaper concerning an article alleging that he was a crime lord involved in serious criminality, had intimidated a prosecution witness, and had threatened and attacked a property developer.

The defendant pleaded justification, alternative Lucas-Box meanings based on reasonable grounds for suspicion, and a public-interest or Reynolds privilege defence. The claimant applied under CPR 3.4(2) to strike out the amended defence for disclosing no reasonable grounds, constituting an abuse of process, or obstructing the just disposal of the proceedings.

The central issues were whether the pleaded facts were sufficiently particularised, relevant and capable of supporting the proposed inferences, and whether the pleaded investigations and sources could support responsible journalism.

1. The court held that Article 10 did not provide a freestanding or overriding defence. Article 10 had to be reconciled with Article 8 and the protection of reputation. In a libel case, established domestic principles, including justification and privilege, would generally provide the appropriate means of achieving the required balance (para [4]-[5]).

2. A justification plea alleging criminal conduct had to set out the facts relied on with the same precision as an indictment. Each particular had to be relevant to, and supportive of, one or more defamatory meanings. General allegations required sufficiently specific examples, and allegations could not be included merely to create prejudice or a climate of suspicion (paras [20]-[25]).

3. Where an inference was relied on, the pleading had to disclose a rational nexus between facts which were admitted or capable of proof and the inference sought. The court should not permit a defendant to proceed on vague allegations in the hope that cross-examination would produce an admission. The defendant had to have evidence, or a solid basis for expecting evidence, capable of proving the pleaded case at trial (paras [26]-[30]).

4. For a defence based on reasonable grounds to suspect, the defendant had to plead primary facts objectively giving rise to the suspicion. Statements that others suspected or believed the claimant to be guilty could not themselves constitute primary facts. The issue had to be assessed as at publication against the overall factual position, without transferring the burden of proof to the claimant (para [27]).

5. A Reynolds plea was not a longstop for an inadequate justification plea. It had to show responsible journalism in the circumstances, including proportionate investigation and verification. The public interest in the subject matter did not, by itself, establish a public-interest defence. Unidentified sources could remain protected, but sufficient information ordinarily had to be pleaded to permit an assessment of their weight and reliability (paras [76]-[81], [86]).

6. The repetition rule prevented a defendant from proving a defamatory allegation merely by showing that someone else had made it. Repeating unsubstantiated rumours, particularly allegations of murder, could not ordinarily amount to responsible journalism. Facts relied on for privilege still had to be capable of proof by admissible evidence (paras [82]-[98]).

7. The judge struck out the passages identified in the judgment, including vague, irrelevant or prejudicial allegations and unsupported assertions of criminality. Other particulars were permitted to remain where, assuming them capable of proof, they could support an inference, partial justification, mitigation of damages, or a pattern of conduct. The court reserved the final form of order and directions for further submissions (paras [33]-[75], [100]-[106]).

First-instance interlocutory decision on the claimant’s application to strike out parts of the defendant’s amended defence. The court ordered that identified passages be struck out and deferred the final form of order and consequential directions for submissions.