Sayed Zulfikar Abbas Bukhari v Syed Tauqeer Bukhari

Permission to amend a statement of case should be refused where the proposed pleading is incoherent, inadequately particularised, or has no real prospect of success. A defence of substantial truth to serious allegations of criminality must identify the imputation relied on and plead sufficient primary facts to establish it. General assertions, repetition clauses, third-party reports, investigations, and unexplained inferences will not suffice. These requirements apply equally to litigants in person. A defence under section 1(3)(a) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 must identify the alleged crime and explain whether the purpose was preventing or detecting it.

The claimant brought claims for libel and harassment concerning publications in which the defendant alleged that he was corrupt, dishonest, criminal, involved in fraud and theft, and responsible for threats and attacks. Following earlier decisions determining the meanings of the publications, the defendant sought permission to amend his Defence for a further time.

The claimant opposed the application, contending that the proposed defence of substantial truth remained inadequately particularised and that the proposed harassment defence was defective. The central issue was whether the June 2023 draft disclosed a coherent and properly particularised defence warranting permission to amend.

1. Application refused. The defendant was refused permission to amend his Defence in the terms of the June 2023 draft.
2. Under CPR rules 17.1(2) and 17.3, the court has a broad discretion, but an amendment must contain sufficient detail to enable the opposing party and the court to understand the case advanced and must disclose reasonable grounds for defending the claim. The court may reject a pleading that is implausible, self-contradictory, unsupported, incoherent or insufficiently particularised.
3. The substantial-truth defence remained defective. For allegations that the claimant personally committed fraud, theft, dishonesty or other criminal conduct, the pleading did not adequately allege the claimant’s personal acts, knowledge, involvement, or the relevant times, places and circumstances. The use of passive language and general cross-references did not cure those defects. Serious allegations require particulars capable of establishing the defamatory meaning as substantially true.
4. The allegations concerning the claimant’s wealth, human trafficking, arms dealing and alleged corruption did not adequately plead the claimant’s state of knowledge, the source and transfer of the money, the statements said to be dishonest, or the primary facts establishing the alleged conduct. Reports of investigations and third-party allegations could not substitute for pleaded primary facts in support of a direct allegation that the claimant managed illegal activities.
5. The defence to harassment under section 1(3)(a) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 was also inadequately pleaded. It did not particularise the crime or crimes allegedly being prevented or detected, nor specify whether the asserted purpose was prevention or detection.
6. The defendant’s status as a litigant in person did not justify a lower pleading standard. The court recognised his difficulties but concluded that the defects remained substantial despite the earlier opportunity to amend.

The judgment records earlier procedural decisions in the same litigation, including [2020] EWHC 3469 (QB), [2022] EWHC 173 (QB) and [2023] EWHC 427 (KB). This judgment determined the defendant’s subsequent application for permission to amend.