Sims v Dacorum Borough Council

At common law, a periodic joint residential tenancy ends automatically when one joint tenant, without the concurrence of the other, serves notice to quit on the landlord. The rule is inherent in the contractual and proprietary nature of the joint tenancy. Its existence and exercise do not, in themselves, engage Article 8 or Article 1 of the First Protocol. The Human Rights Act 1998 does not require conversion of the terminated joint tenancy into a sole tenancy against the owner’s concurrence. The appeal was dismissed and permission to appeal to the Supreme Court refused because the proposed Convention challenge was unarguable.

Mr and Mrs Sims held a secure weekly joint tenancy of a house let by Dacorum Borough Council. After the marriage broke down, Mrs Sims left and served notice to quit, terminating the tenancy. The Council refused Mr Sims’s request to remain as sole tenant and brought possession proceedings.

The Deputy District Judge held that the notice was effective and that possession was lawful and proportionate. On appeal, Mr Sims accepted that the Court of Appeal was bound by Hammersmith and Fulham LBC v Monk [1992] AC 478 and that the appeal must be dismissed. He sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the common-law rule was incompatible with Articles 8 and 1 of the First Protocol and should be modified under the Human Rights Act 1998.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and refused permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.

1. Scope of the challenge. The issue was confined to the compatibility of the rule in Monk with Article 8 and Article 1 of the First Protocol. It did not concern whether the Council’s possession proceedings themselves engaged those provisions or were justified by proportionality.
2. Termination of the joint tenancy. The common-law rule, stated in Hammersmith and Fulham LBC v Monk [1992] AC 478, is that a periodic joint residential tenancy terminates automatically when one joint tenant serves a notice to quit on the landlord without the concurrence of the other. The rule is a substantive rule of property and contract law, inherent in the nature of the joint tenancy.
3. Article 8. Neither the rule itself nor its exercise by one joint tenant, with the landlord merely receiving the notice, constituted interference with the remaining tenant’s respect for his home. Article 8 was therefore not engaged on the facts or in relation to the rule challenged.
4. Article 1 of the First Protocol. The relevant possession was Mr Sims’s interest in a joint tenancy which was inherently terminable unilaterally by either tenant. The Council did not interfere with his peaceful enjoyment of possessions by receiving the notice.
5. Proposed Convention remedy. Treating the notice as a release of Mrs Sims’s interest to Mr Sims would create greater and different property and contractual rights against the Council without its concurrence. The proposed Supreme Court appeal was unarguable, and permission was accordingly refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal against the possession order was dismissed. Permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused: [2013] EWCA Civ 12.
• Watford County Court: Deputy District Judge Wood made a possession order on 16 December 2011, holding that Mrs Sims’s notice to quit validly terminated the joint secure tenancy.
• An appeal to a county court judge was granted permission but was transferred to the Court of Appeal without an intervening substantive judgment.