Lewis & Ors v R.

A conviction is not rendered unsafe by a post-verdict allegation of jury misconduct unless the available material provides a sound basis for doubting the verdict. A juror who has received clear directions must report any concern during the trial. An unsupported complaint made only after verdict will ordinarily justify the inference that no irregularity occurred, particularly where it comes from a dissenting juror.

The exceptional consideration of available material about jury deliberations de bene esse does not weaken the ordinary protection of jury secrecy. Evidence of another person's acquittal, or of a compromise in related civil proceedings, is inadmissible where it does not assist the jury on the issues in the criminal trial.

Following a lengthy jury trial at Wolverhampton Crown Court before Judge Walsh, Ian Lewis, David Fellows and Anthony Geeling were convicted by a 10–2 majority of conspiracy to steal brewing containers. A co-defendant was acquitted. The jury later failed to reach verdicts on a separate count.

After the first verdicts, a dissenting juror approached Lewis and alleged that other jurors had acted improperly, including by using internet material and pressuring a female juror. The Court of Appeal directed the Criminal Cases Review Commission to investigate whether extraneous material had been considered.

The appellants appealed on the safety of their convictions. Fellows and Geeling also renewed applications for leave to appeal concerning evidential rulings and disclosure. The central issue was whether the alleged jury misconduct or any other asserted irregularity undermined the safety of the convictions.

1. The appeals against conviction were dismissed, and the renewed applications for leave to appeal were refused. The CCRC investigation did not substantiate the allegation that jurors had obtained or used extraneous material. The available newspaper article could have had no bearing on the issues at trial.

2. The court considered the material concerning the dissenting juror de bene esse, in the unusual circumstances arising from his contempt proceedings. That course did not weaken the ordinary prohibition on disclosure of jury deliberations, whose principles remained protected by R v Mirza; R v Connor and Rollock [2004] 1 AC 1118.

3. The juror had received and understood directions to report concerns to the judge or jury bailiff, but raised none during the trial. His post-verdict assertions were materially unsupported, and were inconsistent with the jury's acquittal of one defendant and its inability to agree on the separate count. Applying the approach in R v Adams [2007] 1 Cr. App. R 34, silence about an alleged irregularity ordinarily supports the conclusion that none occurred. The court also applied the observation in R v Thompson and Others [2010] 2 Cr. App. R27 that a dissenting juror may perceive ordinary events as suspicious after failing to persuade the majority.

4. The acquittals of the Westwoods, following the prosecution's decision to offer no evidence against them, were irrelevant to whether these appellants had participated in a conspiracy with others. The compromise of related civil proceedings, including the withdrawal of a civil allegation of conspiracy, was likewise inadmissible because it could not assist the jury on the criminal issues.

5. The proposed VAT evidence was properly excluded as irrelevant and inadmissible. The trial judge also correctly refused a disclosure application for a privileged forensic accountancy report which was not in the prosecution's possession and for which there was no reasonable basis to think it would undermine the prosecution or assist the defence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): appeals against convictions for conspiracy to steal dismissed; renewed applications for leave to appeal refused.

• Crown Court at Wolverhampton: before Judge Walsh and a jury, the appellants were convicted by majority verdicts of conspiracy to steal. A co-defendant was acquitted, and the jury later failed to agree on a separate count.