R v Fowsi Haji

Jury deliberations are confidential. A court will not investigate them or receive evidence about them, save for the narrow exceptions of a complete repudiation of the jury’s oath or the introduction of extraneous material.

A juror who disagrees with a verdict announced by the foreperson must express dissent immediately. Silence when the verdict is announced creates a presumption of assent. A complaint made after discharge and dispersal will ordinarily not justify an inquiry, because the public verdict must be respected and jurors may have been influenced after separation. A concern raised immediately, before dispersal, may exceptionally be investigated.

R v Fowsi Haji concerned a conviction for fraud following allegations that the applicant had falsely claimed accommodation and payments by asserting that he had lived at Grenfell Tower at the time of the fire.

At Isleworth Crown Court, the foreperson announced a unanimous guilty verdict and confirmed that it was the verdict of all 12 jurors. The jury were discharged. The following day, two former jurors told court staff that the verdict had in fact been a majority verdict.

The applicant sought an extension of time and leave to appeal, and invited the Court of Appeal to direct a Criminal Cases Review Commission investigation under section 23A of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. The central issue was whether the delayed complaint could cast arguable doubt on the safety of the conviction.

1. The applications were refused. The court declined to extend time, grant leave, or direct an investigation by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. Grounds alleging that the unanimous verdict was inaccurate or amounted to no valid verdict could not succeed. The remaining ground, concerning the absence of a majority direction, depended upon those grounds and also failed.

2. The common-law rule protects the confidentiality of jury deliberations. Evidence about those deliberations is inadmissible and inquiry is prohibited, subject only to the narrow exceptions of a complete repudiation of the jury’s oath and extraneous material introduced into deliberations. That rule was confirmed in R v Mirza [2004] 1 AC 1118.

3. Where a foreperson announces a verdict in the sight and hearing of the whole jury, a juror’s failure to dissent immediately creates a presumption that the juror assented to it. Prompt dissent matters because the verdict can then be reconsidered before it is recorded. The court followed the approach in Nanan v The State (1986) 83 Cr App R 292, R v Austin [2002] EWCA Crim 1796, R v Lewis [2013] EWCA Crim 776, and R v Ul Hamid and Khan [2016] EWCA Crim 483.

4. R v Charnley [2007] EWCA Crim 1354 was distinguishable. There, doubt was raised immediately after the jury left court and before dispersal, leaving no opportunity for outside influence. Here, the jurors had clear instructions, the foreperson twice confirmed unanimity, no juror raised concern before discharge, and the complaint came only the following day after the jury had dispersed. A prior note which had led the judge to prepare a majority direction did not undermine the later unanimous verdict: jurors may change their views and reach unanimity.

5. The public pronouncement had therefore to be accepted as correct. The delayed complaint created no arguable doubt as to safety and did not warrant investigation under section 23A of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In R v Fowsi Haji [2024] EWCA Crim 955, the court refused the applications for an extension of time, leave to appeal against conviction, and a Criminal Cases Review Commission investigation.
• Crown Court at Isleworth: The applicant was convicted of fraud after the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict. Sentencing had been adjourned. No citation for the Crown Court decision was stated.