Cruddas v Calvert & Ors

A defence of truth in libel requires proof that the defamatory sting is substantially true. The court must assess the substance of the allegation, allowing for proportionate latitude in lengthy publications, but cannot treat opinion, inference or system-wide criticism as factual proof. A lawful political funding system cannot be declared corrupt merely because it is controversial or capable of criticism.

For malicious falsehood, the claimant must establish publication, falsity, malice and the requisite pecuniary damage, subject to Defamation Act 1952, section 3. Knowledge that the published meanings are false may establish malice. Investigative journalism involving deception is not automatically unlawful, but materially misleading reporting and deliberate provocation may support a finding of malice.

The claimant, a businessman and Treasurer of the Conservative Party, sued the journalists and publisher of The Sunday Times for libel and malicious falsehood arising from covert recordings of a meeting on 15 March 2012.

The articles alleged that he offered access to the Prime Minister and senior ministers in return for donations, including donations from foreign sources in breach of electoral law. At the first stage, the meanings were determined by the High Court and varied by the Court of Appeal in [2013] EWCA Civ 748. The second-stage issues were truth, falsity, malice, pecuniary damage and damages.

1. Libel. The defendants relied solely on truth. The relevant question was whether the sting of each meaning was substantially true, not whether every detail of the articles was accurate. The court found all three meanings untrue.
2. The meeting showed the operation of publicly advertised donor groups and events. The claimant repeatedly explained that donations did not buy access, policy changes or improper benefits, that donors had to comply with electoral law, and that a donor company had to be a bona fide UK operating company. The articles misleadingly omitted or rearranged those explanations and attributed journalistic inferences to the claimant as facts.
3. The court rejected the contention that the lawful political funding system itself could be characterised as corrupt. Criticism of that system might support honest opinion, but it could not establish truth.
4. Malicious falsehood. The articles were false in the meanings found by the Court of Appeal. The journalists knew the meanings they published were false and had a dominant intention to injure the claimant. The third defendant was vicariously liable.
5. Under section 3 of the Defamation Act 1952, the likelihood of pecuniary damage meant more likely than not to cause such damage. The prospect of a regulatory investigation and substantial associated costs was sufficient. The court awarded £180,000 for libel, including £15,000 aggravated damages, with no double recovery.

1. High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): The first-stage meaning judgment was given in [2013] EWHC 1427 (QB).
2. Court of Appeal: The meaning judgment was varied in one respect in [2013] EWCA Civ 748.
3. High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): The present second-stage judgment found for the claimant in libel and malicious falsehood and awarded £180,000 damages.