Hodgins v Squire Sanders LLP

On an application to strike out a libel meaning under CPR paragraph 4.1 of Practice Direction 53, the court must assess the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in their full context, including the circumstances of publication. A letter before action is not confined, as a matter of principle, to conveying only that an allegation or claim has been made. A targeted communication by the originator of serious allegations may be capable of conveying guilt, particularly where its terms are unqualified and it is sent to an employer or other third parties. The threshold for excluding a pleaded meaning is high, but the court must still apply the overriding objective. The pleaded meaning was therefore capable of being conveyed.

The claimant brought a libel action concerning a letter before action sent by the defendant solicitors. The letter alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and receipt of improper benefits, and was copied to the claimant’s current employer and members of its management board. The claimant pleaded that the letter conveyed that he was guilty of serious misconduct. The defendant applied under CPR paragraph 4.1 of Practice Direction 53 to strike out that meaning as incapable of being borne by the words. The central issue was whether a letter before action could, in its wording and publication context, convey guilt rather than merely the existence of an allegation or proposed claim.

1. Application refused. The words were capable of bearing the pleaded meaning that the claimant had placed himself in a position of conflict, acted in grave breach of fiduciary duty, and accepted bribes or other improper benefits.

2. The court applied the settled approach to meaning. The words had to be assessed by reference to the natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader reading the publication once. The court should avoid over-elaborate textual analysis, should not be unduly literal, and should consider the publication as a whole.

3. The text and the circumstances of publication had to be considered together. The letter was a targeted communication from solicitors acting for the alleged victims of the misconduct. It was copied to the claimant’s employer and the company’s management board, was not marked confidential, and contained serious and unqualified allegations. Those matters cumulatively made the pleaded meaning arguable and capable of being conveyed.

4. There was no class of publication which, merely because it was a letter before action, could only mean that a claim or allegation had been made. Cadam v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd was concerned with whether a justification defence was arguable and did not establish such a restriction. Stern v Piper went no further than recognising that a report that proceedings had been launched might convey no more than that fact; it did not require that meaning in every case.

5. Lewis v Daily Telegraph and Mirror Newspapers v Harrison concerned reports of criminal charges or arrests and did not determine the meaning of this targeted publication on different facts. The application was accordingly refused.