PNM v Times Newspapers Ltd And Ors

The ordinary rule is that the press may report everything occurring in open court. It may be displaced only in unusual or exceptional circumstances. Where open justice and rights under articles 8 and 10 conflict, neither right has automatic precedence. The court must focus intensely on the particular rights, consider the justification for interfering with each, and apply proportionality to both.

The court may ordinarily assume that the public understands the distinction between suspicion and guilt. The risk that some readers may misunderstand an accurate report is one factor in the balance and does not generally justify suppressing truthful court reporting. Particular weight should be given to the interests of affected children, but that consideration is not necessarily decisive.

PNM sought an interim privacy injunction preventing newspapers and journalists from identifying him as a person arrested during a police investigation into serious child sexual offences. He had been released without charge. His name, arrest and related information had nevertheless been mentioned repeatedly in open court during a criminal trial to which he was neither a party nor a witness. Publication had temporarily been postponed under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.

Tugendhat J refused the injunction in [2013] EWHC 3177 (QB). He held that PNM was unlikely to establish at trial that publication should be prohibited. PNM appealed, relying on his and his family’s privacy rights, the presumption of innocence and the interests of affected children. The central issue was whether those considerations justified restricting fair and accurate reporting of open criminal proceedings.

1. Appeal dismissed. The open justice principle applied although the appellant was neither a party nor a witness in the criminal trial. His arrest and associated information had been mentioned repeatedly in open court, and the respondents proposed to publish a fair and accurate report. The judge therefore treated open justice as an important, though not exclusive, element of the decision.
2. The ordinary rule permits the press to report everything occurring in open court. It is a strong rule which may be displaced only by unusual or exceptional circumstances. Reporting has intrinsic public value: it subjects criminal proceedings to scrutiny, supports informed debate and promotes confidence in the administration of justice. Identification can be important because anonymised reporting may be less engaging and may diminish public debate.
3. Where articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights conflict, neither has automatic precedence. The court must focus intensely on the comparative importance of the particular rights, consider the justification for interfering with each, and apply proportionality to both. The question was whether the general public interest in an identifying report justified the resulting curtailment of the appellant’s and his family’s private and family life.
4. The judge was entitled to accept the respondents’ assurance that they intended to publish only a fair and accurate report. The possibility that third parties might then publish inaccurate allegations did not fatally compromise the respondents’ reporting rights or enlarge the scope of the appellant’s rights. The law may ordinarily proceed on the basis that most members of the public understand the distinction between arrest, charge and conviction, and the presumption of innocence. The risk that some readers might misunderstand or behave improperly remained a relevant factor, but it did not place the case in an exceptional category.
5. The children’s interests received full consideration. Particular weight may be accorded to the article 8 rights of children likely to be harmed by publication. On the evidence, however, that weight did not overcome the strong article 10 and open justice considerations. Any possible tension between the authorities concerning children’s rights was immaterial to the outcome.
6. The balancing exercise was evaluative and akin to an exercise of discretion. Appellate intervention was justified only for an error of principle or a conclusion outside the range reasonably open to the judge. No such error was shown. The judgment and existing postponement orders were to remain in place pending final determination of any application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The court unanimously dismissed the appeal in [2014] EWCA Civ 1132. It upheld the refusal of the interim privacy injunction.
2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Tugendhat J refused PNM’s application for an interim non-disclosure order in [2013] EWHC 3177 (QB).