T (Children: Publication of Judgment), Re

[2024] EWCA Civ 697

Case details

Case citations
[2024] EWCA Civ 697 · [2024] 4 WLR 55
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
21 June 2024
Judgment text

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Subjects
Family Human rights Privacy and freedom of expression
Keywords
publication of family judgment anonymisation naming parents Article 8 Article 10 open justice transparency children’s wishes and feelings jigsaw identification delayed publication
Outcome
appeal allowed unanimously
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Publication of a family judgment requires an individualised balancing of privacy under Article 8 and freedom of expression under Article 10. Open justice and transparency are relevant but do not determine the outcome. Naming parents may be justified exceptionally, but not where an anonymised judgment already serves the public interest and naming would make jigsaw identification of the children easy. The court must carefully assess likely harm in the short, medium and long term. If the future impact of delayed publication cannot reliably be predicted, a delayed order to name the parents cannot produce a fair balance. Publication arrangements are normally best decided promptly after trial. Liberty to apply later may be appropriate in an unusual case, but should not encourage routine deferral.

Factual background

The mother appealed against an order made by Mrs Justice Arbuthnot in the publication judgment, [2024] EWHC 161 (Fam). The order provided that, in summer 2026 when T reached 18, the welfare judgment, [2024] EWHC 59 (Fam), should be published naming both parents but referring to T and his adult sister by random initials. The children had expressed a strong wish that their family life remain private. The mother argued that anonymised publication already served transparency and that future publication risked harm. The father relied on his Article 10 rights and the public interest in correcting the family history. The central issue was whether the delayed naming order struck a lawful and fair balance between those competing rights and interests.

Held

Appeal allowed unanimously. The publication order was set aside and replaced by an order giving the father liberty to make a formal application to the judge after T’s eighteenth birthday if he sought further publication.

  1. A decision whether, and in what form, to publish a family judgment is primarily for the judge who heard the case. It requires an individualised balancing of Article 8 privacy rights and Article 10 freedom of expression. The appellate court may intervene only for an error of principle or where the conclusion falls outside the range reasonably open to the judge: PNM v Times Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1132.
  2. The legal framework requires an intense focus on the comparative importance of the competing rights. The analysis is not mechanical or based on generalities: Re S (A Child)(Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2004] UKHL 47 and A local authority v W [2005] EWHC 1564 (Fam). The transparency guidance normally supports anonymisation of children and family members, although exceptional departure remains possible: Griffiths v Tickle (Rights of Women and another intervening) [2021] EWCA Civ 1882.
  3. Several factors relied on by the judge did not justify naming the parents. Anonymised publication already explained the court’s approach to the litigation and to section 9(6) of the Children Act 1989. Naming the parties would add little to public understanding. The father’s Article 10 rights were important, but his proposed speech had not been identified; the situation therefore differed from O (a child) v Rhodes [2015] UKSC 32, concerning a book already written. The children’s ability to read the judgment later was not a sound welfare reason for exposing their childhoods to publicity.
  4. The judge accepted both that jigsaw identification would be easy once the parents were named and that the impact on the children was difficult to predict. The required assessment of likely harm in the short, medium and long terms could not therefore be made: PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26. Although the children’s welfare would no longer be paramount at adulthood, their Article 8 rights would remain. A delayed order could achieve nothing while causing worry, or could expose them to unpredictable harm.
  5. Publication is generally best addressed immediately after trial. The substituted liberty to apply was justified by the unusual circumstances and was not encouragement to defer publication decisions in other cases. The court also observed that section 97(2) of the Children Act 1989 operates only until proceedings end, but left unresolved the wider argument concerning section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)[2024] EWCA Civ 697: allowed the mother’s appeal, set aside the delayed publication order and substituted liberty to apply after T’s eighteenth birthday.
  • High Court of Justice, Family Division — Mrs Justice Arbuthnot, [2024] EWHC 161 (Fam): ordered publication in summer 2026 naming the parents but not the children.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Outcome:
appeal allowed unanimously

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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