Jones & Anor v First Greater Western Ltd

Consent by a private landowner to the appointment of a taxi stand does not, without more, create an implied right of unrestricted access for licensed taxis. The statutory scheme preserves the landowner’s control of access, including the ability to impose conditions or charge a fee, subject to the requirements necessary for the stand to exist and operate. A taxi stand on private land may therefore remain a public stand for regulatory purposes while access is subject to the landowner’s conditions.

Licensed taxi drivers appealed from a decision of HHJ McCahill QC in the High Court, which held lawful a permit scheme introduced by First Greater Western Ltd at the taxi stand at Bristol Temple Meads station. The appellants argued that the Public Health Act 1925 and the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 made the stand freely accessible to all licensed taxis once the landowner had consented to its designation. The respondent maintained that it retained control of access as lessee and could require paid permits. The central issue was whether that unrestricted access obligation arose by necessary implication.

1. Appeal dismissed. The statutory scheme did not imply consent by the landowner to unrestricted access to a taxi stand on private land.

2. Section 76(b) of the Public Health Act 1925 and section 63(1) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 require the landowner’s consent before a stand may be appointed on private land. Neither provision expressly requires the landowner thereafter to permit unrestricted access.

3. The statutory context shows that the consent requirement protects the landowner’s control over the use of its land. It permits agreement about whether a stand is appointed, its precise location, the number of taxis permitted and ancillary matters. The landowner may therefore reserve the right to restrict access or charge a fee, provided the statutory requirements for the stand remain satisfied.

4. The court rejected reliance on byelaw 3. The byelaw required a taxi not actually hired to proceed with reasonable speed to one of the fixed stands. It did not require the driver to proceed to the nearest stand, guarantee a space at a particular stand, or imply that access to a stand on private land could not be restricted. The byelaws could not properly be used as an aid to construing the primary legislation.

5. The suggested statutory purpose of ensuring an adequate supply of taxis at railway stations did not justify the implication. Nor was there an inherent inconsistency between a public taxi stand for regulatory purposes and a stand on private land where entry was subject to a charge.

6. Floyd LJ reached the conclusion without relying on Hulin v Cook, although the result was consistent with that decision. The alternative argument based on the railway byelaws did not require determination.

Underhill LJ agreed that the consent provision was sufficiently explained by the need for co-operation between the authority and private landowner, without implying surrender of the landowner’s property rights. Arden LJ agreed with both judgments.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2014] EWCA Civ 301. Appeal from the High Court decision of HHJ McCahill QC dismissed.
• High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Bristol District Registry: held that the permit scheme at Bristol Temple Meads was lawful and justified.