Haxton v Philips Electronics UK Ltd

A tortfeasor may be liable where its negligence shortens a claimant’s life and thereby diminishes the value of the claimant’s statutory dependency claim. The resulting loss is recoverable in the claimant’s personal action as damage to a valuable chose in action. Recovery does not enlarge or interfere with the dependency damages available under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976.

The applicable remoteness test is reasonable foreseeability. It is reasonably foreseeable that curtailing a person’s life may reduce the value of an existing litigation claim. The wrongdoer must take the victim’s economic circumstances, including existing legal rights, as they are found.

Both Mr and Mrs Haxton developed mesothelioma through asbestos exposure attributable to Philips Electronics UK Ltd. After Mr Haxton’s death, Mrs Haxton settled a dependency claim under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. Its value reflected her shortened life expectancy and therefore excluded dependency beyond her anticipated death.

In separate personal injury proceedings, Mrs Haxton claimed £200,000 for the resulting reduction in the value of her dependency claim. Liability and her other damages were agreed. A deputy High Court judge held that this additional loss was not recoverable.

The central issue on her appeal was whether the negligent curtailment of her life had caused a legally recoverable diminution in the value of her statutory dependency right.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. The claimant was entitled to recover the agreed additional sum of £200,000. Elias LJ gave the judgment, with which Beatson LJ and Dame Janet Smith agreed.

2. Under section 3(1) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, dependency damages must correspond to the dependant’s actual loss. Dependency necessarily ends when the dependant dies. The original dependency claim therefore could not be calculated by reference to a period beyond the claimant’s own life expectancy: [1979] A.C. 567 applied and [2001] EWCA Civ 178 explained.

3. That limitation did not determine the separate personal injury claim. The defendant’s negligence had reduced the value of a statutory right belonging to the claimant. The claimant could recover that diminution as damage to a valuable chose in action. This did not expand the dependency damages available under the Act or otherwise disturb its statutory scheme.

4. The law permits recovery for the loss or diminution of a valuable legal right. The reasoning in [2011] EWCA Civ 669 and [2013] EWCA Civ 972 supported recovery where wrongdoing deprived a claimant of, or reduced, a valuable cause of action or contractual benefit. It was immaterial that the right in the present case was statutory rather than contractual.

5. Factual causation alone does not establish the extent of tortious liability. The court must also decide, as a matter of fair and reasonable legal responsibility, whether the loss falls within the scope of liability: [2002] 2 AC 883 applied. Nothing in principle, policy or the statutory scheme excluded this loss.

6. The loss was not too remote. The modern test is whether it was reasonably foreseeable, and a wrongdoer must take the victim’s economic condition as found: [2003] UKHL 64 applied. It was reasonably foreseeable that shortening a person’s life could diminish the value of an existing litigation claim. Elias LJ therefore disagreed with Lord Pearce’s tentative suggestion in [1979] A.C. 467 that such loss appeared too remote.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was allowed unanimously. The claimant was awarded the agreed additional sum of £200,000: [2014] EWCA Civ 4.

2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: Mr David Pittaway QC, sitting as a deputy judge, held that the diminution in the claimant’s dependency claim was not a recoverable head of damage. Permission to appeal was granted by the judge.