Alexis Karalis v Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary

In a false-imprisonment claim arising from a police arrest, the usual focus is the state of mind of the arresting officer. The officer may rely on information supplied by investigating or briefing officers, including hearsay or intelligence, provided the source and context afford reasonable grounds for suspicion. The officer must exercise an independent judgment and must not merely obey an instruction.

Only in exceptional circumstances, such as deliberate lies by the briefing officer, an arrest procured without lawful justification, or failure by the arresting officer to exercise a discretion, may the court need to examine the briefing officer’s state of mind. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, applying the restricted approach to interference with trial findings.

The claimant appealed from a County Court judgment following a jury trial concerning his arrest and detention on suspicion of rape. He had succeeded only in establishing a breach of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, section 28, resulting in unlawful detention for 45–50 minutes and an award of £750. His remaining false-imprisonment claim and parasitic assault and battery claim were dismissed, and adverse costs orders were made.

The appeal challenged the findings that the arresting officer honestly suspected the claimant, had objectively reasonable grounds for that suspicion, and believed arrest was necessary. It also challenged the refusal to leave to the jury whether the investigating officer honestly suspected the claimant, particularly after a witness changed her identification before the arrest.

1. Appeal dismissed. The lower court’s decision was neither wrong nor unjust because of serious procedural or other irregularity under CPR 52.21(3).
2. False imprisonment arising from a police arrest is ordinarily determined by applying the adapted Castorina questions. The court asks whether the arresting officer suspected that an offence had been committed and that the arrested person was guilty, whether objectively reasonable grounds existed, whether the officer believed arrest was necessary under section 24(5) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and whether reasonable grounds supported that belief.
3. The relevant suspicion and information are ordinarily those in the mind of the arresting officer. The officer may rely on information from another officer, hearsay, intelligence, or other material not admissible at trial. The court must assess the source, context and surrounding circumstances. The officer must, however, make an independent assessment and must not simply obey an order.
4. The authorities are reconcilable. Davidson concerned the distinction between merely supplying information and directing or procuring an arrest. Copeland involved deliberately false information intended to procure the arrest. Such exceptional cases may require examination of the briefing officer’s conduct or state of mind. The ordinary transmission of an arrest request within a police investigation does not do so.
5. On the facts, the arresting officer independently assessed the information in the high-priority arrest request and exercised her discretion. The claimant’s differing physical description did not eliminate reasonable suspicion. The fingerprint in the vehicle used for the rape, identification evidence, the vehicle-purchase evidence and the surrounding investigative material provided an objectively reasonable basis. The later identification of another man did not necessarily extinguish that basis.
6. The appellate court should not interfere with a trial judge’s findings of fact, evaluation of evidence or inferences unless compelled to do so. The lower court’s findings were properly supported by the evidence and were entitled to appellate respect.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division): The appeal from the County Court at Chesterfield was dismissed.
• County Court at Chesterfield: The claimant recovered £750 for unlawful detention caused by failure to comply with section 28 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The remaining claims were dismissed, with the claimant ordered to pay 80% of the defendant’s costs.