TTM v London Borough of Hackney & Ors

A person may be falsely imprisoned where one public authority unlawfully and directly causes another authority to detain that person, even though the detaining authority acts lawfully. Section 6(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983 protects hospital managers who rely on an apparently valid admission application. It does not cure the unlawfulness of an application prohibited by section 11(4).

Detention resulting directly from such an application contravenes article 5 of the Convention. Section 139(1) must be read compatibly with the right to compensation. Whether a medical recommendation from a practitioner acquainted with the patient is “practicable” under section 12(2) permits a professional assessment of the patient’s and public interests, including the value of independent assessment.

The appellant was detained for treatment after an Approved Mental Health Professional applied for his admission under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983. His nearest relative had objected, but the professional mistakenly and in good faith believed that the objection had been withdrawn. Burton J granted habeas corpus because section 11(4) prohibited the application.

In subsequent judicial review proceedings, Collins J held that the hospital trust could rely on the apparently valid application under section 6(3), that the detention remained lawful until the habeas corpus order, and that article 5 was not infringed. He also found no breach of section 12(2), although neither recommending doctor had previously known the appellant.

The appeal concerned whether the detention was unlawful from its inception, whether compensation was available under article 5(5), and whether the recommendations contravened section 12(2).

1. Appeal allowed against the local authority. Toulson LJ, with whom Jackson LJ and the President agreed, held that the appellant was unlawfully detained under domestic law and article 5. The Approved Mental Health Professional had no lawful justification for making an application prohibited by section 11(4) of the Mental Health Act 1983. Her application directly caused the deprivation of liberty, despite her good faith.

2. False imprisonment may be committed by a person who unlawfully and directly causes another person to carry out the detention. The immediate detainer may nevertheless act lawfully. The hospital trust was authorised by section 6(3) to rely on an application which appeared duly made, but its lawful conduct did not cure the underlying unlawfulness of the professional’s application.

3. The reasoning in Re S-C was correct. Section 6(3) protects hospital managers against liability when they act on an apparently valid application; it does not transform detention caused by a fundamentally defective application into lawful detention. The contrary obiter reasoning in R v Central London County Court, ex p London could not be reconciled with that principle.

4. The detention also infringed article 5 because it resulted from a state agent’s failure to follow a statutory safeguard prescribed for the protection of liberty. Article 5(5) therefore entitled the appellant to compensation. Section 139(1) was to be read compatibly under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, permitting a compensation claim against the local authority. Leave under section 139(2) was granted. Section 6(3) was not to be weakened because prompt reliance by hospitals on apparently regular applications serves the public interest.

5. There was no breach of section 12(2). “Practicable” has sufficient elasticity to accommodate urgency, professional judgment and the interests of the patient and society. Given the disagreement between clinicians acquainted with the appellant, obtaining two fresh independent assessments was a responsible course. The social worker could not reasonably have been expected to insist on using the recommendation of one acquainted clinician.

6. It was unnecessary finally to decide whether non-compliance with section 12(2) would invalidate an application. The modern approach examines the provision’s place in the statutory scheme, the seriousness and consequences of non-compliance, and whether Parliament intended total invalidity. Any purely formal breach on these facts would not have defeated the provision’s underlying purpose.

• Court of Appeal: Allowed the appeal against the local authority for the reasons in [2011] EWCA Civ 4. It held that the detention was unlawful under domestic law and article 5, and that leave should be granted for a compensation claim. It upheld the rejection of the section 12(2) claim against the hospital trust.
• Administrative Court, Collins J: Dismissed the judicial review claim on 11 June 2010. He held that section 6(3) authorised the hospital trust to act upon the apparently valid application, that the detention was lawful until the habeas corpus order, that section 12(2) had not been breached, and that article 5 was not infringed.
• High Court, Burton J: On 11 February 2009 granted habeas corpus and ordered the appellant’s immediate release. The admission application was prohibited by section 11(4) because the nearest relative’s objection had not been withdrawn.