Thompson v James

In determining defamatory meaning, the court must apply the ordinary and natural meaning which a reasonable reader would take from the publication read as a whole. An appellate court will not lightly disturb a trial judge’s finding on meaning unless it is quite satisfied that the judge was wrong.

A reference to a local authority slush fund ordinarily imputes improper and corrupt use of public money. Context may affect meaning, but an explanatory side bar did not neutralise that imputation. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not require an additional presumption favouring a non-defamatory meaning where criticism concerns public officials. Its free-expression values are already reflected in the established common-law test.

Mrs Thompson published blog posts criticising Carmarthenshire County Council and its chief executive, Mr James. Mr James counterclaimed in libel in respect of several posts. The High Court upheld the counterclaim in respect of three posts, including a post asserting that Mr James and his cronies had financed deals before budget reductions and that the Council had to keep its slush fund topped up.

Tugendhat J held that the post alleged that Mr James was unlawfully and corruptly using public money for the benefit of himself and his cronies. Mrs Thompson appealed only that finding of meaning. She contended that the words referred only to allegedly unlawful funding of libel proceedings, that any criticism was of the Council rather than Mr James personally, and that Article 10 required any balance to be resolved in favour of a non-defamatory meaning.

1. Appeal dismissed. Longmore LJ, with whom Black and Underhill LJJ agreed, held that the court should not lightly interfere with an experienced trial judge’s factual determination of defamatory meaning. Intervention was justified only if the appellate court was quite satisfied that the judge was wrong. The court was not so satisfied.
2. The applicable inquiry was the reasonable reader’s understanding of the publication as a whole, including its context. Applying the principles in Jeynes v News Magazine Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 130, the reader was neither naïve nor unduly suspicious, could read implications, and was not to select a defamatory meaning where a non-defamatory meaning was properly available.
3. The expression slush fund, in the context of local-authority expenditure, naturally imputed that money was being used for improper purposes and that its provider was acting corruptly. The Side Bar identified the alleged funding mechanism but did not alter that ordinary meaning. Its heading, referring to Mr James and the Council slush fund, reinforced the personal connection.
4. The second post did not portray Mr James as an innocent beneficiary of an impugned Council decision. By referring to the foresight of “Mark James and his cronies” and to the funding arrangements, it conveyed that he had been instrumental in establishing the arrangement or knew it was established for his benefit. The judge’s meaning was therefore sustainable.
5. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights did not require a further, ninth principle favouring a non-defamatory meaning whenever public officials were criticised. The established meaning test had already accommodated freedom of expression. The proposed addition duplicated the existing protection against selecting a bad meaning where a non-defamatory meaning was available and encouraged over-elaborate analysis.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2014] EWCA Civ 600, dismissed Mrs Thompson’s appeal against the finding of defamatory meaning.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Tugendhat J upheld Mr James’s libel counterclaim in respect of three blog posts. The citation for that decision is not stated in the judgment.