Haile v London Borough of Waltham Forest

Under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996, intentional homelessness is assessed by reference to the deliberate act that caused the applicant to cease occupying accommodation, not by reference to the position when the authority makes its decision. If the applicant became intentionally homeless at that earlier point, a later event which would have made the accommodation unavailable does not alter that conclusion. The past tense in section 191, contrasted with present-tense questions such as whether the applicant is homeless, requires this temporal distinction. The rule in Din v Wandsworth London Borough Council [1983] AC 657 remains applicable under the 1996 Act.

Ms Haile applied to the London Borough of Waltham Forest for accommodation under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. She had left a hostel room before giving birth, and the Council later decided that she was intentionally homeless because she had deliberately abandoned accommodation which it had been reasonable for her to continue to occupy.

A reviewing officer upheld that decision on 31 January 2013. HHJ Birtles dismissed Ms Haile’s county court appeal on 23 October 2013. The Court of Appeal granted permission on the issue whether intentional homelessness had to be assessed when the applicant became homeless or when the Council made its decision.

The appeal was dismissed.

1. Temporal issue. Under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996, the causative inquiry is directed to the time when the applicant ceased to occupy the accommodation. If a deliberate act caused the applicant to become homeless at that time, a later event which would independently have made the accommodation unavailable does not displace the finding of intentional homelessness.
2. Statutory language. Section 191 uses the past tense in referring to when the applicant became intentionally homeless. Sections 190(1), 192(1) and 193(1) use present-tense language for other questions. The deliberate distinction requires the authority to investigate the historic cause of homelessness while assessing the other statutory conditions by reference to the position at the date of decision.
3. Section 175(3). Section 175(3) was enacted in response to Pulhofer v Hillingdon London Borough Council [1986] 1 AC 484. It concerns whether accommodation is reasonable to continue to occupy and does not alter the separate causation issue determined in Din.
4. Authorities. Din v Wandsworth London Borough Council [1983] AC 657 remained binding because section 191 materially re-enacted section 17 of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. The purposive approach to regulation 8(2) discussed in Banks v Kingston Upon Thames Royal London Borough Council [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1443 could not be applied by analogy because the statutory context differed.

Lord Justice Fulford and Lord Justice Christopher Clarke agreed with Lord Justice Jackson. The appeal was dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 13 June 2014, dismissed the appeal and held that the intentional-homelessness inquiry was governed by the date on which the applicant left the accommodation. [2014] EWCA Civ 792
2. Mayor’s & City of London County Court: HHJ Birtles dismissed the appeal against the Council’s review decision on 23 October 2013.
3. London Borough of Waltham Forest review: The reviewing officer upheld the Council’s decision that Ms Haile was intentionally homeless on 31 January 2013.