DSD & Anor v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis

Damages under the Human Rights Act 1998 are not tortious or automatically compensatory. The court must decide whether an award is necessary to afford just satisfaction, taking account of all the circumstances, including declarations, other remedies and the principles applied under Article 41 of the Convention.

A declaration may suffice in some cases, but damages are appropriate where an Article 3 breach causes distinct physical or psychological harm and ordinary public law relief cannot repair the wrong. Parallel compensation does not automatically extinguish the claim. It must be considered to avoid overcompensation, while allowing for the possibility that a settlement was made at an undervalue or addressed different harm.

The claimants had previously obtained declarations that the Metropolitan Police Service breached Article 3 by failing effectively to investigate sexual assaults committed by John Worboys. The present hearing concerned only whether damages were necessary and, if so, their amount.

The Commissioner relied on settlements with Worboys, Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority payments, disciplinary proceedings and the eventual prosecution of Worboys. The central issues were whether those matters precluded or reduced damages under sections 8(3) and 8(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998, and how compensation should be assessed.

1. Damages and just satisfaction. The court held that the statutory question was whether damages were necessary to afford just satisfaction. The HRA cause of action is not tortious and does not create a general compensatory regime. The court had to apply the Strasbourg Article 41 approach, including flexibility, equity and consideration of the overall context.
2. A declaration was insufficient. The breaches caused harm distinct from the original assaults, including psychological harm caused by ineffective investigations. The court therefore awarded damages in addition to declaratory relief. A recognised psychiatric condition was a significant aggravating factor, although compensation remained broad-brush and was not calculated by a strict counterfactual or by assigning a separate sum to every factor.
3. Under section 8(3), settlements and other awards relating to the same underlying events had to be taken into account. They did not automatically extinguish the claims. The Worboys settlement concerned claims pleaded against Worboys alone, was expressly made for less than full value, and did not settle the HRA claims against the police. Nevertheless, overlapping compensation, including compensation for the rape and treatment costs, had to be reflected to avoid double recovery.
4. Disciplinary sanctions did not reduce damages. Internal investigations and acknowledgment of failings could be relevant to the overall context and aggravating factors, but there was no bad faith requiring an enhanced award. The eventual apprehension and conviction of Worboys also formed part of the overall assessment.
5. The court treated Strasbourg awards as the primary comparators, with appropriate regard to inflation, purchasing power and domestic evidence. Relevant factors included the duration and systemic nature of the breach, the seriousness of the consequences, causation, medical evidence, other payments, claimant and defendant conduct, and totality.
6. DSD was awarded £22,250, comprising £20,000 for non-pecuniary harm to judgment and £2,250 towards future treatment. NBV was awarded £19,000, comprising £17,000 for the rape and police-caused psychological harm and £2,000 towards future treatment.

The judgment concerned the quantum stage of proceedings following the liability judgment in [2014] EWHC 436 (QB). The court had found the defendant liable for breach of the Human Rights Act 1998 and subsequently assessed damages.