McCreaner v Ministry of Justice

Public-law error in calculating a prisoner’s release date may make continued detention false imprisonment. Mere delay in recalculating a date is insufficient: it must reflect an improper purpose, irrationality or another recognised public-law error.

A public authority generally owes no duty of care in formulating policy or gathering information under statutory powers. A duty may arise, however, when a prison has identified that a prisoner is eligible for home detention curfew and assumes responsibility for completing the release process. Failure to prioritise that process in accordance with policy may constitute negligence.

The claimant, a former prisoner, sought damages after the Supreme Court’s decision in R (Noone) v Governor of Drake Hall Prison, [2010] UKSC 30, established that he was eligible for home detention curfew. He contended that the Ministry of Justice and HMP Wayland unlawfully detained him for 119 days and were liable in false imprisonment, negligence, misfeasance in public office and under the Human Rights Act 1998.

The central issues were whether detention before the claimant’s ordinary release date was unlawful, whether a duty of care arose in the policy and implementation stages, and whether the prison negligently delayed the final steps required for release.

1. False imprisonment. The tort requires proof of imprisonment and failure by the defendant to establish lawful authority. Public-law error in calculating a release date can in principle prevent justification of detention. But after 1 July 2010 the claimant was detained pursuant to the court’s sentence while his lawful HDC eligibility date was being calculated. Delay alone did not establish public-law error, and no improper purpose, irrationality or other recognised error was shown. Under the binding approach in R (Francis) v Secretary of State for Justice, [2012] EWCA Civ 1200, detention pursuant to a valid sentence remained lawful until the discretionary HDC decision was made.
2. Negligence. The Ministry’s policy formulation, failure to anticipate the Supreme Court’s decision and central process of identifying affected prisoners did not create sufficient proximity or an assumption of responsibility. Those matters were public functions, and the reasoning in W v Home Office and Mohammed v Home Office applied.
3. The position changed when HMP Wayland identified that the claimant had been eligible since 1 July and told him that only address information was required. At that point the prison assumed responsibility for completing the final release process, or alternatively came into a sufficiently proximate relationship with him for a duty of care to arise.
4. The prison breached that duty by treating the claimant as an ordinary HDC case instead of prioritising him as required by Ministry policy. The delay in obtaining and acting on probation information, and the further delay after approval, fell below the required standard. Six weeks could reasonably have been saved.
5. The claims in misfeasance, under articles 8, 5(1) and 14 of the Convention, and under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998, failed. There was no evidence of subjective recklessness or bad faith. The domestic authorities concerning detention pursuant to a lawful sentence remained binding despite the contrary Strasbourg approach.
6. The claim therefore succeeded only to the extent of negligence causing six weeks’ additional detention. Damages were awarded for that period.

not stated in the judgment.