Dexter, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for Justice

Detention of an indeterminate sentence prisoner after a direction for release remains lawful while necessary release conditions are being arranged, provided the Secretary of State implements the direction within a reasonable timeframe. Reasonableness depends on the overall circumstances, including the sentence, the expected residence condition, planning, unforeseen events, the suitability of alternative accommodation and any genuinely adverse effect caused by national provision of Approved Premises.

Section 28 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 does not require immediate release. A general duty under section 2 of the Offender Management Act 2007 to make sufficient provision is not an individual right to particular accommodation. On the facts, the delay did not breach domestic public law, negligence principles or Article 5 of the Convention.

The claimant was serving an indeterminate sentence for public protection. The Parole Board directed his release subject to residence at Norfolk Park Approved Premises and other licence conditions. The direction became final after the applicable reconsideration period, but release occurred 81 days later because the available placement was lost and beds became unavailable following improvement works connected with a legionella outbreak.

He sought judicial review on three grounds: unreasonable delay and breach of section 28(5) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997; negligent detention; and breaches of Article 5 of the Convention. The central issues were whether the delay was unreasonable, whether the statutory and public-law framework permitted continued detention pending accommodation, and whether the detention had become arbitrary or disconnected from the original sentence.

1. Ground 1. Permission was granted because the reasonable-time claim was arguable, but the substantive claim was dismissed. The Court of Appeal’s decision in R (Bowen & Stanton) v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] 1 WLR 2170 established that section 28 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 does not require release within a few days regardless of whether the conditions necessary for safe release are in place. Residence at Approved Premises may be integral to the Parole Board’s decision.
2. The Secretary of State nevertheless owes a domestic public-law duty to take reasonable steps to secure the Parole Board’s conditions within a reasonable timeframe. The assessment is fact-sensitive and must consider the overall context, rather than the bare number of days. Relevant matters included the indeterminate sentence, the absence of any right to release on a particular date, advance planning, unforeseen events, the suitability of the selected premises, possible alternatives, and any genuinely adverse effect from national unavailability.
3. The delay was reasonable. The claimant had served almost eight years; Norfolk Park was central to his tested resettlement plan; a place had been secured before the hearing; the Parole Board’s decision was issued late; and the loss of beds resulted from unforeseen local circumstances. The failure to investigate alternatives was less than ideal, but waiting for the identified and particularly suitable placement was not unreasonable. The evidence did not establish a national or regional shortage which had genuinely caused the delay.
4. Section 2 of the Offender Management Act 2007 imposes a high-level duty to make sufficient provision for probation purposes. It does not require particular assistance for an individual. Resources are relevant to compliance with that duty, and the evidence did not show systemic insufficiency.
5. Ground 2. Permission was refused. No duty of care arose. There was no assumption of responsibility or sufficient proximity, and the statutory and public-law duties left no room for a parallel negligence duty. In any event, there was no breach because the detention was reasonable.
6. Ground 3. Permission was refused. The Parole Board retained judicial control over whether release was safe, and the Secretary of State had only a reasonable period to implement the direction. The absence of an endorsed release date did not make detention arbitrary. The high Article 5 threshold was not met, there was no systemic failure, and no break occurred in the causal link between the original sentence and detention. The combination of the Parole Board’s direction and judicial review availability also satisfied Article 5(4).

First-instance judicial review proceedings in the Administrative Court. The judgment itself records no appeal from this decision.