The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority v The Information Commissioner & Anor

The right conferred by section 1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 is a right to recorded information, not to a particular document. Nevertheless, supplying or permitting inspection of the document may be necessary where that is the only way to communicate all the information recorded in it.

Recorded information may include visual features such as logos, letterheads, handwriting, layout, style and design. Physical characteristics of the recording medium fall outside the right. Section 11 governs the means of communication but cannot authorise a public authority to communicate less information than section 1(1) requires. In assessing reasonable practicability under section 11(2), the authority may consider all relevant circumstances, not merely those specific to the individual request.

A journalist requested information under section 1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 from the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority. The request concerned three invoices or receipts supporting Members of Parliament’s expense claims. IPSA supplied transcripts but withheld copies of the documents.

The Information Commissioner decided that the transcripts omitted recorded information comprising logos and letterheads, the appearance of handwriting, and the documents’ layout, style and design. He required IPSA to provide redacted copies. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed IPSA’s appeal, and the Upper Tribunal dismissed its further appeal in [2014] UKUT 33 (AAC).

The Court of Appeal considered whether the omitted visual material was recorded information and whether IPSA’s chosen means of communication nevertheless satisfied section 11.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Commissioner was entitled to find that the invoices contained non-exempt recorded information which IPSA’s transcripts had not communicated. The First-tier Tribunal’s affirmation of that decision contained no material error of law, and the Upper Tribunal correctly dismissed IPSA’s appeal.

2. “Information” in section 1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 bears its ordinary, broad meaning. It includes visual as well as linguistic information. Although the Act distinguishes a record from the information recorded in it, that distinction does not prevent disclosure of the record itself from being necessary in practice to communicate all the recorded information.

3. The physical properties of a recording medium, such as the weave or weight of paper or the technical specification of electronic storage, are features of the record rather than recorded information. By contrast, material appearing on the face of a document may constitute recorded information. Whether presentational features do so requires assessment in the particular case.

4. The Commissioner properly treated the invoices’ logos and letterheads, handwriting and manuscript comments, and layout, style and design as recorded information. Those features conveyed information relevant to the supplier’s identity and the document’s genuineness. Their possible utility in a forensic inquiry was relevant but was not the statutory touchstone. The applicant’s motive or purpose remained irrelevant.

5. Section 1(1) itself imposes the duty to communicate the information requested. Section 11 performs a separate function. It requires effect, so far as reasonably practicable, to an applicant’s stated preference and otherwise permits reasonable means of communication. It does not qualify section 1(1) or permit a shortfall in the information communicated.

6. For completeness, the request was properly understood as seeking copies, in substance as a means of obtaining all the recorded information, rather than an opportunity to inspect the originals. Written freedom-of-information requests should be read objectively and in context, while recognising their potentially informal character and the authority’s duty to seek clarification where needed.

7. The tribunals construed “all the circumstances” in section 11(2) too narrowly. The expression includes everything capable of affecting the reasonable practicability of a particular means of communication, not only circumstances specific to the individual request. That error was immaterial because section 11 could not excuse IPSA’s failure to communicate all the information required by section 1(1).

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Dismissed IPSA’s appeal in [2015] EWCA Civ 388. The Upper Tribunal had correctly found no material error of law, although both tribunals had construed section 11(2) too narrowly on an immaterial issue.
2. Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): Dismissed IPSA’s appeal in [2014] UKUT 33 (AAC), finding no material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.
3. First-tier Tribunal: Dismissed IPSA’s appeal against the Information Commissioner’s decision notice.
4. Information Commissioner: Upheld the complaint and required IPSA to provide redacted copies of the three invoices.