D H, R v

Time spent subject to an electronically monitored curfew must be credited against sentence under section 240 A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 where its statutory conditions are met. A young person remanded to local-authority accommodation with such a curfew is not technically remanded in custody for that Act. Nevertheless, the sentencing court should give equivalent credit by analogy where the loss of liberty is effectively the same, subject to deductions for proved breaches.

A substantial allowance for youth may properly be made even for grave, adult-type gang violence involving a knife. A sentence will not be manifestly excessive where the sentencing judge has properly reflected both the offender’s youth and the exceptional seriousness of the offending.

Two young applicants renewed applications for permission to appeal sentences imposed at Snaresbrook Crown Court on 28 October 2015 after guilty pleas to causing grievous bodily harm with intent. They and another offender had surrounded an unarmed 14-year-old in a public shopping area. One used a knife, causing grave liver injuries.

The sentencing judge treated the offence as warranting an adult starting point of 15 years’ imprisonment. He reduced that starting point for youth and then allowed 25 per cent credit for the guilty pleas, imposing five years and eight months’ detention under section 91.

The renewed applications challenged the sentences as manifestly excessive. A further issue concerned credit for periods spent under electronically monitored curfews while remanded to local-authority accommodation.

1. The appeals were allowed only in respect of curfew credit. The court rejected the contention that the sentences were manifestly excessive. This was exceptionally serious group violence, committed in public with a knife and an intention to cause really serious injury. The sentencing judge had already made a substantial reduction from the adult starting point to reflect youth and immaturity. The 25 per cent reduction for guilty pleas was also correct because the pleas were first offered at the plea and case-management hearing.
2. Section 240 A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 required credit for the applicant H’s qualifying electronically monitored curfew. There were 182 qualifying days. The court therefore directed that 91 days should count as time served, while otherwise leaving the sentence undisturbed.
3. The court identified a statutory anomaly affecting a young person remanded to local-authority accommodation with an electronic curfew. Such a remand was not a remand in custody for the purposes of the 2003 Act, although a comparable curfew imposed on an adult on bail, or on a young person remanded to detention, attracted statutory credit. The court held that the same half-day credit should be given by analogy because the curfew imposed effectively the same loss of freedom.
4. For the applicant D, the statutory calculation was applied by analogy. His breaches had resulted in secure remand, and there was no evidence of breaches on the other curfew days. The court directed that seven days, being half of the two weeks spent on curfew, should count towards his sentence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On renewed applications after the single judge’s refusal, the court granted permission and allowed the appeals solely to direct credit for electronically monitored curfews. It rejected the challenge that the sentences were manifestly excessive: [2016] EWCA Crim 1807.
• Crown Court at Snaresbrook: On 28 October 2015, the applicants were sentenced to five years and eight months’ detention for causing grievous bodily harm with intent.