A, R. v

A remand to local authority accommodation under s. 91(3) of the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 does not attract automatic credit as time served under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. A sentencing judge may nevertheless reflect the period in the sentence where the interests of justice require it, having regard to its duration and the restrictions imposed. That assessment is fact-sensitive and is not mathematical.

A qualifying electronically monitored curfew during such a remand should receive credit by analogy with s. 240A. Any credit must be incorporated into the sentence imposed. Neither the Crown Court nor the Court of Appeal may direct the relevant authorities to give administrative credit for that period.

The respondent, then aged 16, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after participating in a fatal joint attack. At the Manchester Crown Court, he received five years’ detention under s. 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.

Before sentence, he had spent eight days remanded to youth detention accommodation under s. 91(4) of the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. He then spent 192 days remanded to local authority accommodation under s. 91(3), subject to a 12-hour electronically monitored curfew and other restrictive conditions.

The parties incorrectly advised the sentencing judge that all remand time would be automatically deducted. The appeal, brought out of time after the error emerged, concerned whether and how the latter period could be reflected in sentence.

1. Appeal allowed. The court quashed the five-year sentence and substituted four years and 269 days’ detention under s. 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.

2. Read with s. 242(2)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 240ZA provides automatic administrative credit for a child remanded to youth detention accommodation under s. 91(4) of the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. It does not provide automatic credit for a remand to local authority accommodation under s. 91(3). The appellant therefore remained entitled to automatic credit for the eight days spent in youth detention accommodation.

3. The court followed R v D & H [2016] EWCA Crim 1807. The appellant’s qualifying electronically monitored curfew while remanded under s. 91(3) warranted 96 days’ credit, calculated by analogy with s. 240A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

4. The statutory exclusion from automatic credit does not prevent a judge from reducing a sentence to reflect time on a s. 91(3) remand where the interests of justice require it. The duration of the remand and the restrictive conditions may be relevant. Such cases will probably be rare, and the exercise is evaluative rather than purely arithmetical. On these facts, no further reduction beyond the curfew credit was justified.

5. Neither court had power to order the authorities to credit time spent on a s. 91(3) remand or its qualifying curfew. The lawful mechanism is a net sentence that already incorporates any credit. The court also stressed the need for advocates, particularly prosecutors, to give accurate assistance on sentencing issues.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2019] EWCA Crim 106, the court granted an extension of time and permission to appeal, allowed the sentence appeal, quashed the five-year detention sentence, and substituted four years and 269 days’ detention.

• Manchester Crown Court: On 11 May 2018, HHJ Stockdale QC sentenced the appellant to five years’ detention under s. 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.