Platt, R v

Where the Criminal Justice Act 2003 supplies a statutory code for bad-character evidence, admissibility must be determined solely under that code. Earlier common-law principles do not supplement it. Under section 101(1)(e), the court must decide whether the evidence has substantial probative value and whether the matter to which it relates is of substantial importance in the case. “Substantial” has its ordinary meaning and should not be glossed.

Expert psychiatric evidence on a witness’s credibility or propensity requires a sound evidential basis showing features for which expert assistance is necessary. General associations between mental disorder, substance misuse and violence will not establish a relevant propensity. An erroneous admission of bad-character evidence does not require a conviction to be quashed unless it renders the conviction unsafe.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Manchester of murder and arson with intent to endanger life. He received life imprisonment with a minimum term of 30 years for murder, with a concurrent sentence for arson.

His co-defendant ran a cut-throat defence. The trial judge admitted three of the appellant’s previous convictions at the co-defendant’s request. The judge also excluded psychiatric evidence advanced by the appellant about the co-defendant’s mental state, credibility and alleged propensity to violence.

On appeal, the central issues were whether the bad-character ruling should have been made under the common law or the Criminal Justice Act 2003, whether the psychiatric evidence was admissible, and whether any error made the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The trial judge erred in admitting the appellant’s previous convictions, but the convictions remained safe.

2. Bad-character admissibility was governed exclusively by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Section 99 had abolished the former common-law rules. The judge should therefore not have relied on the common-law approach in R v Randall.

3. For section 101(1)(e), the judge had to determine whether the evidence had substantial probative value and whether the relevant matter was of substantial importance in the case as a whole. The statutory word “substantial” bears its ordinary, unelaborated meaning. The old arson conviction and the two convictions for offences under section 20 were remote and materially different from the charged conduct. They had no substantial probative value concerning a propensity to commit the murder or the arson, and should not have been admitted.

4. The psychiatric evidence was properly excluded. Applying the relevance and fairness principles for general expert evidence, the material did not identify particular mental features requiring expert assistance on credibility. The opinions were general, conflicted with the evidence of the psychiatrist who had examined the co-defendant, and did not establish a propensity to murder or cause very serious injury. There was no evidence of a psychotic episode at the material time. Its admission would have distracted rather than assisted the jury.

5. The erroneous admission of the appellant’s convictions did not make the verdict unsafe. The judge carefully directed the jury about their limited value, age and factual dissimilarity. The remaining evidence against the appellant was strong, including his opportunity, fingerprint evidence, DNA evidence and the absence of the trainers shown on CCTV. The appeal against conviction therefore failed.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Dismissed the appellant’s appeal against conviction: [2016] EWCA Crim 4.

2. Crown Court at Manchester On 5 December 2014, convicted the appellant of murder and arson with intent to endanger life. He received life imprisonment with a minimum term of 30 years, less time on remand, and a concurrent determinate sentence for arson.