London Borough Tower Hamlets v B

Care proceedings concerning alleged child radicalisation are governed by the ordinary civil standard of proof. The seriousness of the allegations or consequences does not raise that standard. The court must determine facts on the evidence and may draw reasonable inferences, while distinguishing inference from suspicion, surmise or speculation.

Radicalisation is individual and fact-sensitive. Strict religious observance, without more, does not establish susceptibility to extremist ideology. The welfare analysis must focus on the particular child’s needs, emotional harm, risk, parental responsibility and the proportionality of the findings sought. The court’s protective function is not to police lawful beliefs or impose a project of ideological de-radicalisation.

The local authority sought findings concerning the radicalisation of six children, parental responsibility for the eldest child’s attempted journey to Syria, exposure to extremist material and the continuing risk to the children. The proceedings followed an earlier judgment, London Borough of Tower Hamlets v B [2015] EWHC 2491 (Fam), in which the eldest child had been removed from her parents’ care.

The present hearing addressed disputed facts, the extent of the parents’ involvement, the effect of prolonged exposure to violent and extremist material, the risk posed by the eldest child, and the appropriate care arrangements. The central issues were whether the statutory threshold was established and what arrangements best met the children’s welfare needs.

1. The court applied the ordinary balance of probabilities. Under Children Act 1989, the seriousness of the allegations and consequences did not justify a heightened standard. A fact had to be found proved or not proved; the court could not remain undecided. Inherent probabilities were relevant only as part of the ordinary assessment of the evidence.

2. The court accepted the guidance in Re BR (Proof of Facts) [2015] EWFC 41: evidence had to be assessed in its whole context, with careful attention to the reliability and credibility of witnesses. Suspicion was not enough, but reasonable inferences from proved facts remained permissible.

3. The evidence established that B had been radicalised and had suffered significant emotional harm through repeated exposure to violent and death-related material. Her continuing emotional numbness and lack of empathy created a significant risk of harm to herself and others. The allegation that she had engaged in attack planning was not proved.

4. The father had not deliberately indoctrinated B, but his failure to monitor internet use, his deception of safeguarding agencies and his exposure of the children to disturbing material materially contributed to the harm. The mother likewise failed to protect B and participated in the false appearance that her internet use was being monitored. The court did not find that the mother knew of the plan to travel to Syria.

5. The court rejected any general correlation between rigorous Islamic observance and susceptibility to extremist beliefs. Radicalisation was a complex, dynamic and individual process. The particular combination of influences in this family could not be treated as a general model.

6. The welfare objective was protection and the restoration of B’s independence, empathy and opportunity to develop. It was not to police beliefs or impose ideological de-radicalisation. Although B remained at risk, returning her home, subject to an effective care plan, monitoring, education and restrictions on parental influence, best met her welfare needs.

7. A final care order was made. The local authority was directed to prepare the detailed care plan and the matter was to be listed expeditiously for consideration of its terms.

The judgment was a first-instance determination in care proceedings. It followed an earlier judgment in the same proceedings, [2015] EWHC 2491 (Fam), but no appellate history was stated.