A v London Borough of Enfield

A local authority must assess a 16- or 17-year-old’s needs across the full welfare spectrum. The fact that parents offer accommodation does not establish that the child is neither homeless nor in need. Parental inability to protect a child from serious risks may engage the duties under sections 17 and 20 of the Children Act 1989.

An assessment must identify the child’s needs, the services required, the responsible agencies and an operational plan. In serious safeguarding cases, the intensity of rationality review is heightened. A child unlawfully denied accommodation cannot automatically be deemed a former relevant child, but the authority may, and in an appropriate case may be required to, consider treating the child as such.

The claimant was a 16-year-old who had repeatedly left home and travelled abroad alone. There were concerns about radicalisation, vulnerability, domestic abuse, her proposed relationship with an older man and the absence of safe, stable accommodation.

Tower Hamlets accommodated her briefly under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 and referred her to Enfield. Enfield concluded that she was not homeless because her parents remained willing to accommodate her, and therefore did not require services under section 17. It later undertook an inadequate assessment and declined further assistance.

The claimant sought declarations concerning her status as a child in need, the failure to accommodate her, and treatment as a former relevant child. The central issues were whether Enfield’s assessment was lawful and what relief remained available after she turned 18.

The claim succeeded. The court held that Enfield’s decision-making was fundamentally flawed and irrational.

1. Child in need. Section 17 covers a wide spectrum of welfare issues and requires the authority to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in need. The authority must ascertain and give due consideration to the child’s wishes and feelings. The risks associated with radicalisation, travel to dangerous countries, an intended marriage to a much older man, alleged domestic abuse, uncertainty about her whereabouts and the absence of safe accommodation placed the claimant within the scope of section 17.
2. False logic concerning homelessness. Enfield impermissibly reasoned that because the claimant’s parents offered a home, she was not homeless and therefore could not be in need. Parents may be unable to protect a child from risk, and their continuing offer of accommodation may be irrelevant to the child’s welfare needs. The reasoning was manifestly irrational.
3. Accommodation. A reasonable decision-maker applying the broad section 17 assessment could only conclude that the claimant was a child in need and required accommodation under section 20. The authority could not avoid its section 20 responsibilities by diverting the matter to housing services.
4. Lawful assessment. The assessment had to consider the child’s developmental needs, parenting capacity, and family and environmental factors. It should identify the required help and support, the agencies responsible, objectives, timescales and outcomes. Enfield’s assessment did not constitute that systematic process.
5. Review and relief. The gravity of the possible harm justified heightened scrutiny of the authority’s reasoning. The claimant could not automatically be deemed a former relevant child because she had not in fact been accommodated for the statutory period. However, the authority had to consider whether to treat her as if she were a former relevant child. Given the interim section 20 order and the identified unlawfulness, the declarations sought were not academic.

This was a first-instance judicial review. On 19 November 2015 Walker J ordered interim accommodation and support under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 pending determination of permission or further order.