Scatliffe v Scatliffe

Under the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1995, the court must consider all property and financial resources owned, or likely to be owned, by either party. Non-matrimonial property means property owned by one party, not property in which neither party has an interest. It remains relevant and may be transferred to meet needs or compensation. The ordinary approach is to apply sharing to matrimonial property, then assess whether the statutory factors and the concluding obligation require further adjustment. A matrimonial home’s future ownership is ordinarily dealt with under sections 25 and 26, even if brought into the marriage by one spouse. An appellate court may affirm adequate lower-court reasons without repeating them.

The husband appealed against ancillary-relief orders following the parties’ divorce. The High Court ordered the transfer of the former matrimonial home to the wife, gave the husband a life interest in another property with the remainder to the parties’ children, and allowed him to retain a building constructed on Crown land. The Court of Appeal dismissed the husband’s appeal but allowed the wife’s cross-appeal to a limited extent by ordering a lump sum of $50,000. Before the Privy Council, the principal issues concerned the treatment of matrimonial and non-matrimonial property, undisclosed or omitted assets, the jurisdiction to transfer the matrimonial home, and the adequacy of the Court of Appeal’s oral reasons.

The Board, in a single opinion drafted by Lord Wilson, dismissed the husband’s appeal. It advised that the wife’s limited costs of opposing the appeal should be paid by the husband.

1. The Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1995 was materially analogous to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Principles developed in England and Wales under the latter Act were persuasive in applying sections 23 and 25 of the 1995 Act, as recognised in Wheatley v Wheatley, HCVAP 2007/006.
2. The court must have regard under section 26(1)(a) to property and financial resources owned, or likely to be owned, by either party. An asset in which neither party has an interest is excluded, but property owned by one party before marriage or acquired by inheritance remains non-matrimonial property and cannot simply be ignored. The ordinary approach is first to apply the sharing principle to matrimonial property and then to consider whether the statutory factors and the concluding words of section 26(1) require further adjustment for need or compensation, including transfer of non-matrimonial property.
3. The future ownership of a matrimonial home is ordinarily determined under sections 25 and 26. Section 25 extends to transfer of a matrimonial home. Part IV may regulate occupation temporarily. Proceedings under ancient Married Women’s Property Acts to determine existing beneficial interests have become obsolete where divorce courts possess wide redistributive powers, as explained in Bromfield v Bromfield [2015] UKPC 19.
4. The judge’s order concerning the remainder in the second property was not strictly a settlement for the wife under section 25(1)(b), and section 29(1)(a) precluded an order transferring property to adult children. However, the wife had agreed to the substance of the arrangement, and its terms could be recast as an agreement.
5. The husband’s refusal to disclose bank statements justified the finding that he had undisclosed resources. The omission of the guest-house from the financial assessment also demonstrated that the appeal was unsustainable. The overall distribution, including a home and rental income for each party, was a reasonable exercise of discretion under section 26(1).
6. The Court of Appeal was entitled to adopt and affirm the trial judge’s reasons without repeating them at length. Applying the approach in In re Portsmouth City Football Club Ltd, Neumans LLP (a firm) v Andronikou [2013] EWCA Civ 916, the Board found that the husband had understood the basis of the decision.

1. Privy Council. The appeal was dismissed on 12 December 2016: [2016] UKPC 36.
2. Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (British Virgin Islands). On 16 September 2013, the husband’s appeal was dismissed and the wife’s cross-appeal was allowed to a modest extent.
3. High Court of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (British Virgin Islands). On 3 January 2012, ancillary relief orders were made in favour of the wife.