NRAM Ltd v Evans & Ors

An entry in the Land Register which correctly records a voidable disposition when made is not a mistake, even if the disposition is later rescinded. Its rescission does not retrospectively convert the entry into a mistake for the purposes of Schedule 4 to the Land Registration Act 2002.

Once such a disposition is rescinded, the court may, and ordinarily must, alter the register to bring it up to date. The special restrictions governing rectification do not apply. A priority order available on rectification cannot be used to restore a charge retrospectively or with its former priority when the register is merely updated.

NRAM mistakenly submitted an electronic discharge of a 2004 registered charge securing the appellants’ mortgage borrowing. The High Court set the discharge aside for mistake and ordered re-registration of the charge as if it had never been removed, with its original priority. It treated the alteration as rectification under Schedule 4 to the Land Registration Act 2002.

Mr and Mrs Evans appealed, contending that the register could not be rectified and that NRAM held or supplied inaccurate personal data. The Chief Land Registrar intervened. The central issue was whether, after rescission of a voidable electronic discharge, reinstatement of the charge corrected a mistake in the register or merely brought the register up to date.

1. The appeal was dismissed, subject to a limited variation of the order. The discharge was valid when entered on the register because it arose under a disposition that was voidable, rather than void, and had not then been rescinded. Its later rescission could not retrospectively make the earlier deletion of the charge a mistake in the register.
2. The distinction between void and voidable dispositions was principled. Schedule 4 concerns whether the register was wrong at the time of entry or deletion. A void disposition may produce a mistaken entry, but an unrescinded voidable disposition does not. The court drew support from Norwich and Peterborough Building Society v Steed [1993] Ch 116.
3. After rescission, the register no longer reflected the parties’ rights. The proper order was therefore alteration to bring it up to date under paragraph 2(1)(b) of Schedule 4 to the Land Registration Act 2002. Under paragraph 3(3), the court had to make that order absent exceptional circumstances, of which there were none. As the order was not rectification, NRAM did not have to establish the conditions in paragraph 3(2), and the appellants had no Schedule 8 indemnity claim.
4. The judge erred in treating the alteration as rectification and in restoring the charge as if it had never been removed and with its former priority. Paragraph 8 applied only to rectification and permitted a change of priority only for the future. Those words were deleted from the order.
5. The challenge under sections 13 and 14 of the Data Protection Act 1998 also failed. The appellants had not shown that NRAM held inaccurate personal data or had supplied inaccurate data to credit reference agencies.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Varied the order to remove retrospective reinstatement of the charge and its former priority, but otherwise dismissed the appeal: [2017] EWCA Civ 1013.
2. High Court, Chancery Division: HH Judge Jarman QC set aside the electronic discharge, ordered re-registration of the charge and dismissed the data-protection claim: [2015] EWHC 1543 (Ch).