Stevenson v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

In social-security cases engaging Article 14 and A1P1, status is interpreted broadly. An identifiable date-of-claim characteristic may suffice. The court must justify the discriminatory effect of the rule, while allowing the legislature a wide margin in social-welfare policy.

A bright-line cap available only to new claimants may be lawful where it rationally pursues a targeted welfare objective, remains administratively workable and is not manifestly without reasonable foundation. Loans for later adaptations and loans to acquire larger accommodation may arise in materially different circumstances and need not be treated as analogous.

Fiona Stevenson, a disabled claimant receiving income support, obtained a shared-ownership flat with a mortgage exceeding £100,000. The support for mortgage interest scheme applied a £100,000 cap to her because she had claimed income support before 5 January 2009. New claimants after that date could benefit from a £200,000 cap.

The First-tier Tribunal dismissed her appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision. The Upper Tribunal dismissed a further appeal in its decision released on 8 October 2015. The Court of Appeal considered whether the temporal limit and the different treatment of loans for larger accommodation and loans for disability adaptations breached Article 14, read with A1P1 or Article 8.

Appeal dismissed unanimously. Henderson LJ delivered the principal judgment. Jackson LJ agreed. Arden LJ also agreed and added that the Secretary of State had systems capable of providing a safety net for claimants, so the absence of active consideration of disabled claimants when the regulations were made did not make the scheme unjustifiable.

1. Entitlement to social-security benefits falls within the ambit of Article 14 because it is a possession protected by A1P1. The requirement of status is interpreted broadly. The date on which a disabled person first claimed income support was an identifiable characteristic capable of constituting status. Disability and age did not provide the relevant basis of comparison on the facts.
2. Justification requires consideration of a legitimate aim, rational connection, less intrusive means and fair balance. In social-welfare cases the court allows a wide margin of appreciation and intervenes only where the policy is manifestly without reasonable foundation. The discriminatory effect of the measure, rather than the scheme viewed generally, must be justified.
3. The £200,000 cap was introduced as part of a targeted response to the 2008 financial crisis, aimed principally at working-age home owners with larger mortgages who were at risk of repossession after losing employment. It was rational to use a clear cut-off date. Cost, administrative convenience and the need to ration scarce resources supported the distinction, and the evidence did not show real hardship among disabled claimants subject to the old cap. The difference was therefore justified.
4. The comparison between loans for later adaptations and loans used to acquire larger accommodation was false. Adaptation loans generally followed an earlier purchase and a subsequent change in circumstances. Loans used to acquire suitable larger accommodation met the claimant’s needs at the time of purchase. The groups were not in analogous situations, and the difference was justified in any event. The adaptation exception was not confined to physical disabilities.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): in [2017] EWCA Civ 2123, dismissed the appeal unanimously.
• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): in the decision released on 8 October 2015, Case No. CIS/601/2012, dismissed the appeal from the First-tier Tribunal.
• First-tier Tribunal (Social Security and Child Support): on 27 September 2011, dismissed the appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 25 November 2010.