Howe v Motor Insurers' Bureau

A claim for compensation under regulation 13 of the Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) (Information Centre and Compensation Body) Regulations 2003 is a claim for damages for personal injuries within CPR Part 44.13. The conforming interpretation required by EU law applies to national law as a whole, including procedural rules not enacted to implement a directive.

The common law distinction between debt and damages must therefore be disapplied in this context. Regulation 16 does not alter the result: compensation becomes a civil debt only once its amount has been assessed. A claimant seeking unassessed compensation consequently receives qualified one-way costs shifting on the same basis as an injured claimant proceeding against an insured driver.

The appellant was severely injured in France when his lorry collided with a wheel detached from an unidentified vehicle. He claimed compensation from the Motor Insurers’ Bureau under regulation 13 of the Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) (Information Centre and Compensation Body) Regulations 2003.

Stewart J dismissed the substantive claim as statute barred in [2016] EWHC 640 (QB). The subsequent appeal was struck out in [2017] EWCA Civ 302 after Moreno v MIB [2016] UKSC 52. In a second judgment, [2016] EWHC 884 (QB), Stewart J held that the claim was not one for damages for personal injury under CPR Part 44.13.

The remaining appeal concerned whether qualified one-way costs shifting applied to the compensation claim and whether the Bureau could enforce costs attributable to an unsuccessful claim for declaratory relief.

1. Appeal allowed. The claim for compensation under regulation 13 of the Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) (Information Centre and Compensation Body) Regulations 2003 was a claim for damages for personal injuries within CPR Part 44.13. The qualified one-way costs shifting regime therefore applied.

2. The EU-law duty of conforming interpretation was engaged. It applies to national law as a whole, rather than only to provisions enacted to implement a directive. The associated principles of equivalence and effectiveness also applied even though the appellant's substantive assertion of an EU-derived right had ultimately failed. The procedural protection had to accommodate persons who had, or might have, valid claims.

3. The appropriate comparator for equivalence was an injured person claiming against an insured driver. Such a claimant would receive qualified one-way costs protection. Excluding an equivalent regulation 13 claim would place the claimant in a less favourable position and would conflict with the purpose of providing equivalent and effective protection for victims of unidentified or insufficiently insured vehicles.

4. The word “damages” in CPR Part 44.13 was therefore interpreted as including regulation 13 compensation. That interpretation departed from strict common law taxonomy but went with the grain of the procedural rules and the rationale of qualified one-way costs shifting. The Directives required the compensation to remain the same whether sought from the responsible driver, an insurer or the compensation body.

5. Regulation 16 did not convert an unassessed compensation claim into a debt. A debt must be ascertained before it is “due and owing”. The provision applies after compensation has been assessed and may also apply to an ascertained subrogated claim between compensation bodies.

6. CPR Part 44.16(2) required the first-instance judge to exercise a discretion and evaluate what was just before permitting enforcement of costs attributable to the declaratory claim. Stewart J had indicated that he would refuse permission. The Bureau identified no error of principle in that discretionary conclusion, so the Court of Appeal declined to reconsider it afresh.

Lewison LJ gave the leading judgment. McFarlane LJ and Sir James Munby agreed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2017] EWCA Civ 932, unanimously allowed the appeal from the second High Court judgment and held that qualified one-way costs shifting applied.
2. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2017] EWCA Civ 302, struck out the appeal concerning limitation because Moreno v MIB [2016] UKSC 52 made it bound to fail.
3. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: In [2016] EWHC 884 (QB), Stewart J held that the compensation claim was not a claim for damages for personal injury under CPR Part 44.13, but granted permission to appeal.
4. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: In [2016] EWHC 640 (QB), Stewart J dismissed the substantive claim as statute barred.