Police of the Metropolis v Brown

[2018] EWHC 2471 (QB)

Case details

Case citations
[2018] EWHC 2471 (QB)
Court
High Court (Queen's Bench Division)
Judgment date
31 July 2018
Judgment text

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Subjects
Civil procedure Costs Qualified one-way costs shifting
Keywords
QOCS mixed claims personal injury adverse costs orders CPR 44.16(2)(b) costs enforcement access to justice
Outcome
appeal allowed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

The qualified one-way costs shifting regime applies automatically to proceedings consisting only of a claim for damages for personal injury, subject to the other specified exceptions. Where proceedings also include a claim for another form of loss, they are a mixed claim. The proceedings fall within the QOCS regime, but the court may permit enforcement of a defendant’s costs order under CPR 44.16(2)(b), to the extent that justice requires. It is unnecessary to decide whether the personal injury and non-personal injury elements arise from separate causes of action or are severable.

Factual background

Andrea Brown brought claims against the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police arising from the use and disclosure of information about her travel. She advanced claims under the Data Protection Act 1998 and Human Rights Act 1998, together with misfeasance in public office and misuse of private information. She also claimed damages for depression, although that personal injury claim failed.

The trial judge held that QOCS applied automatically. The defendants appealed, arguing that the proceedings included claims other than damages for personal injury. The central issue was whether such mixed proceedings fall within the court’s discretion under CPR 44.16(2)(b).

Held

  1. Appeal allowed. The proceedings included claims for losses other than damages for personal injury. They therefore fell within CPR 44.16(2)(b), giving the trial judge discretion to permit enforcement of the defendants’ costs orders to the extent considered just.
  2. CPR 44.13 is a broad gateway. It applies to proceedings which include a claim for damages for personal injury. It does not mean that every claim within proceedings containing a personal injury claim receives automatic protection.
  3. CPR 44.16(2)(b) refers to proceedings which include a claim other than a claim for damages for personal injury. Where a claimant seeks damages for personal injury and something else, the proceedings are a mixed claim. They remain within the QOCS regime, but enforcement of adverse costs is subject to the court’s discretion.
  4. The relevant question is whether the claimant is claiming anything other than damages for personal injury. If not, QOCS protection applies automatically, subject to the other exceptions. If so, CPR 44.16(2)(b) applies. It is unnecessary to dissect the proceedings by causes of action, remedies, or severability.
  5. The discretion permits a fair and flexible response to different mixed claims. A routine claim for personal injury and modest property damage might ordinarily retain protection, whereas an unusual case in which the non-personal injury claim dominates might justify enforcement.
  6. The trial judge was to decide whether, and to what extent, enforcement should be permitted.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  • High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): Appeal allowed against the costs judgment of HHJ Luba QC dated 24 March 2017. The issue whether to exercise the CPR 44.16(2)(b) discretion remained with the trial judge.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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