Jeffreys v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis

Qualified one-way costs shifting applies to proceedings that include a claim for damages for personal injury, even where that claim is minor or subsidiary. CPR 44.16(2)(b) applies where the proceedings also include a claim for the claimant’s benefit other than damages for personal injury. No divisibility or severability requirement arises: different losses may result from the same facts or breach. The close relationship between claims is relevant to the court’s discretion over the extent of enforcement, not to the existence of the power. The exception may operate even where the claimant’s claim has been dismissed in full; the zero recovery under CPR 44.14(1) does not prevent enforcement under CPR 44.16.

This was an appeal from a costs order made after a jury dismissed claims for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office. The underlying claim included physical and psychological injury, loss of liberty, distress and claims for aggravated and exemplary damages. The County Court applied the qualified one-way costs shifting regime but permitted enforcement of 70 per cent of the defendant’s costs under CPR 44.16(2)(b). The claimant argued that the non-personal-injury claims were inseparable from the injury claims and that the exception could not operate after total dismissal. The central issues were the construction of CPR 44.16(2)(b), the meaning of mixed claims and the effect of complete dismissal.

Appeal dismissed. Mr Justice Morris upheld the power to permit enforcement of the costs order under CPR 44.16(2)(b).

1. Construction. CPR 44.13(1) deliberately brings within qualified one-way costs shifting a wide range of proceedings, including proceedings in which the personal-injury claim is minor or subsidiary. The wording of CPR 44.16(2)(b) is imperfect because the section applies to proceedings rather than claims. It must therefore be read as applying where proceedings include a claim for personal-injury damages and another claim for the claimant’s benefit which is not a claim for personal-injury damages.
2. Mixed claims. False imprisonment, malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office are actionable per se. The pleaded claims for loss of liberty, distress, humiliation, fear and upset, together with aggravated and exemplary damages, were distinct claims for losses other than personal injury. The proceedings therefore contained substantial non-personal-injury claims, even apart from the physical and psychological injury claims.
3. No divisibility requirement. CPR 44.16(2)(b) contains no requirement that personal-injury and non-personal-injury claims be divisible or severable. Different types of loss may arise from the same facts or breach of duty. If claims are closely or inextricably linked, that relationship may be reflected in the discretion as to the extent of costs enforcement, but it does not prevent the power arising. Howe v Motor Insurers Bureau [2016] EWHC 884 (QB) was distinguished because its declaration added nothing to the personal-injury damages claim. The suggested reading of LL v The Lord Chancellor was not followed. Guidance in Thompson v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1998] QB 498 confirmed that substantial damages could arise independently of personal injury.
4. Total dismissal. QOCS is defined by the type of proceedings, not by whether the claimant obtains a recovery. CPR 44.14(1) ordinarily imposes a ceiling based on damages and interest recovered, which is zero where the claim is wholly dismissed. The express exceptions in CPR 44.16 take enforcement outside that ceiling, so permission may be granted notwithstanding complete dismissal. The exercise of the discretion and the 70 per cent figure were not challenged.

1. High Court (Queen’s Bench Division) — In [2017] EWHC 1505 (QB), Mr Justice Morris dismissed the appeal and upheld the power to permit enforcement of the costs order to the extent of 70 per cent.
2. Central London County Court — Following dismissal of the underlying claims after a jury trial, His Honour Judge Freeland QC ordered the claimant to pay the defendant’s costs and permitted enforcement to the extent of 70 per cent under CPR 44.16(2)(b).