The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Brown

Qualified one-way costs shifting under Section II of Part 44 of the Civil Procedure Rules applies automatically to proceedings consisting solely of a claim for damages for personal injury, subject to the specified exceptions.

Where proceedings include a claim for personal injury and another claim, they are mixed claims. The court then has discretion under CPR 44.16(2)(b) to permit enforcement of an adverse costs order, to the extent that justice requires. It is unnecessary to dissect the causes of action or decide whether the personal injury claim is severable. The central question is whether the claimant claims anything beyond damages for personal injury.

Andrea Brown brought claims against the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police arising from the use and disclosure of information about her travel. She relied on breaches of the Data Protection Act 1998, breaches of the Human Rights Act 1998, misfeasance in public office and misuse of private information.

Her claim included alleged psychiatric injury, but also claims for distress, declarations, erasure of information, compensation and aggravated and exemplary damages. The first-instance judge held that QOCS protection applied automatically. The issue on appeal was whether the inclusion of claims beyond damages for personal injury brought the proceedings within CPR 44.16(2)(b).

1. Appeal allowed. The proceedings included claims other than a claim for damages for personal injury. They therefore fell within the exception in CPR 44.16(2)(b).
2. CPR 44.13 creates a broad gateway. Proceedings pass through it where they include a claim for damages for personal injury. That does not mean that every claim within those proceedings receives automatic QOCS protection.
3. CPR 44.16(2)(b) is properly read as referring to proceedings which include a claim other than a claim for damages for personal injury. The provision addresses mixed claims and gives the court discretion to permit enforcement of a defendant’s costs order, to the extent that it considers just.
4. The relevant question is whether the claimant claims anything other than damages for personal injury. If not, QOCS protection applies automatically, subject to the other exceptions. If so, the court’s discretion under CPR 44.16(2)(b) is engaged.
5. It is unnecessary to analyse whether claims are based on separate causes of action, remedies or facts, or whether the personal injury claim is severable. An inseverable claim for personal injury may still form part of a mixed claim. The discretion permits the court to deal fairly with the variety of mixed claims and prevents non-personal-injury claims being dressed up as personal injury claims to obtain automatic protection.
6. The judge’s conclusion that the personal injury claim was not severable from the other claims did not answer the statutory question. The matter was left for the judge to decide whether, and to what extent, enforcement of the defendants’ costs orders should be permitted.

• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the appeal from the costs judgment of HHJ Luba QC dated 24 March 2017. The proceedings fell within CPR 44.16(2)(b), and the question whether to permit enforcement was remitted to the judge’s discretion.