Williams, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

A statutory right to registration as a British citizen may be made exercisable only through a valid, fee-paid application. Where primary legislation authorises fees and permits, but does not require, exemptions or waivers, regulations imposing a fee without relief for impecunious applicants are not ultra vires merely because inability to pay postpones registration.

Article 8 does not guarantee acquisition of a particular citizenship, although an arbitrary denial may exceptionally engage private life. A temporary inability to pay, where leave to remain is available and a later application remains possible, does not ordinarily constitute such an interference. Impecuniosity defined by inability to pay the fee is not an “other status” under article 14. In any event, a uniform fee may be justified by the legitimate aims of efficient administration and funding immigration control.

The appellant was born in the United Kingdom to Jamaican parents and, after ten years’ continuous residence, became eligible to apply for registration as a British citizen under section 1(4) of the British Nationality Act 1981. His application was rejected because his destitute family could not pay the prescribed £673 fee. At that time he received local-authority support under section 17 of the Children Act 1989.

Hickinbottom J dismissed his judicial review claim in [2015] EWHC 1268 (Admin). The appellant later obtained leave to remain, paid the fee and acquired citizenship. The Court of Appeal nevertheless heard the appeal because the issues retained wider importance.

The appeal challenged the fee scheme as ultra vires, incompatible with articles 8 and 14 of the Convention, and contrary to common-law legality.

1. Appeal dismissed. The statutory language authorised the Secretary of State to require an application under section 1(4) of the British Nationality Act 1981 to be accompanied by a prescribed fee. Section 51(3) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 permitted, but did not require, exceptions or a power to waive fees. Regulation 9 of the 2013 Regulations consequently rendered an unpaid application invalid. The absence of relief for impecunious applicants was not ultra vires.

2. Registration under section 1(4) was a statutory entitlement subject to Parliament’s chosen conditions, not a fundamental or constitutional right existing independently of the legislation. The fee requirement formed part of the statutory purpose rather than frustrating it. Inability to pay normally postponed registration because eligibility remained and the application could be made later. The scheme was also subject to good-faith administration, statutory controls on fee-setting and parliamentary scrutiny.

3. Article 8 does not guarantee a right to acquire a particular nationality. An arbitrary denial of citizenship may exceptionally affect private life, but there were no such circumstances here. The appellant could obtain leave to remain without paying a fee, faced no proposed removal or separation from his parents, and retained the opportunity to apply for citizenship later. Any interference was, alternatively, marginal and proportionate to the legitimate aims of an efficient scheme, funding immigration and border control, and limiting burdens on other applicants.

4. For article 14, the relevant suggested status was not childhood or receipt of local-authority assistance because neither caused the rejection. It was impecuniosity, defined by inability to pay the prescribed fee. That relative and potentially temporary condition was not an “other status”. Even if article 14 applied, the uniform fee pursued legitimate social and economic objectives and had a rational and proportionate justification.

5. The common-law challenge rested on the same mistaken characterisation of citizenship registration as a fundamental right. It could not succeed where the fee scheme accorded with the governing legislation and the Convention. Underhill and Macur LJJ agreed with Davis LJ.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2017] EWCA Civ 98, the court unanimously dismissed the appeal and endorsed Hickinbottom J’s judgment.

2. Administrative Court: Hickinbottom J dismissed all four grounds of judicial review in [2015] EWHC 1268 (Admin) and refused permission to appeal. Permission was subsequently granted by Underhill LJ.