Zaman, R. v

Where gross negligence manslaughter is alleged by a failure to take reasonable steps to protect customers with declared allergies, the breach may be a single omission. The jury may assess all the evidence to decide whether the defendant took reasonable steps in the circumstances. A Brown direction is unnecessary unless the prosecution advances distinct and alternative acts or omissions, each capable by itself of constituting the alleged breach.

A proven failure to maintain adequate safeguards against a known fatal allergen may make a significant contribution to a resulting death, notwithstanding negligent conduct by staff. The standard is objective and concerns the steps a competent restaurateur would reasonably take.

The appellant owned a restaurant from which a customer, who had declared that his meal should contain no nuts, was served food containing peanut. The customer suffered a fatal anaphylactic reaction.

At Teesside Crown Court, the appellant was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter and six food-safety offences. He received six years’ imprisonment for manslaughter, with concurrent sentences for the food-safety offences.

He appealed against conviction and sentence. His principal complaints concerned the judge’s directions on breach of duty and legal causation. He contended that the jury should have been required to identify a particular negligent act or omission, and that staff negligence could have been the sole cause of death.

1. The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed. The conviction was safe. The evidence entitled the jury to conclude that the appellant had failed to take reasonable steps to protect customers who declared food allergies.

2. The prosecution alleged one breach of duty: failure to take reasonable steps to avoid injury to customers with declared allergies. The possible safeguards, including training, supervision, systems preventing contamination and warnings, were evidential means by which that single duty could have been discharged. They were not distinct breaches requiring a Brown direction. The jury were correctly directed to consider all the evidence and determine whether the steps taken were reasonable.

3. Applying Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171, legal causation required the breach to cause or make a significant, rather than negligible, contribution to death. The appellant had deliberately not advanced a separate causation case at trial. In any event, if the jury found the alleged failure to take reasonable protective steps, it was beyond sensible argument that the failure materially contributed to the death. Negligence by restaurant staff did not displace that conclusion.

4. The standard of care was objective: the reasonable steps a competent restaurateur would take in the circumstances. The appellant had conceded the serious and obvious risk of death from peanut exposure. No further jury direction was needed on a conceded issue.

5. The judge’s Lucas direction was appropriate. The appellant’s alleged lies were relevant to his credibility on the central issue of whether he had put effective safeguards and instructions in place. Any inclusion of alleged lies from the witness box could not affect the verdict’s safety.

6. The six-year sentence was not manifestly excessive. Gross negligence manslaughter sentencing is highly fact-specific. The prolonged disregard of known fatal risks, the absence of effective systems and the failure to act after warnings were substantial aggravating features.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against conviction and sentence: [2017] EWCA Crim 1783.
• Crown Court at Teesside: the appellant was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter and six food-safety offences, and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for manslaughter.