Dillon, R v

Where a young offender is sentenced in the Crown Court, Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, section 8(2), requires remittal to the relevant Youth Court unless remittal would be undesirable. Whether remittal is undesirable depends on the circumstances, including any trial judge’s particular knowledge of the facts, the risk of unjustified disparity between co-defendants, and delay or duplication of procedure.

If the statutory referral conditions are met, the Youth Court must make a referral order. That jurisdiction is exclusive to the Youth Court and cannot be acquired by a Crown Court judge acting under a general district-judge jurisdiction. Where remittal is no longer appropriate because of delay and procedural error, an appellate court may exceptionally substitute a conditional discharge if the statutory criterion is met.

The appellant, aged 16 when he allowed his bank account to be used to receive and transfer £18,900 obtained by fraud, pleaded guilty at the Central Criminal Court to two counts of arranging to receive and convert criminal property. By sentence he was 18. Although the pre-sentence report recommended a referral order and identified remittal to the Youth Court as necessary, the Crown Court imposed a 12-month rehabilitation order.

He appealed against sentence, contending that the Crown Court should have remitted the case to the Youth Court and that a referral order would then have been mandatory. The central issues were whether the Crown Court had power to make such an order and what sentence should now replace the rehabilitation order.

1. Appeal allowed. The Crown Court had no power to make a referral order. Under section 8(2) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, it should have remitted the appellant to the relevant Youth Court unless satisfied that remittal would be undesirable.

2. The court applied the guidance in R v Lewis (1984) 79 Cr App R 94. None of the possible reasons against remittal arose. There had been no trial requiring the sentencing judge’s particular knowledge of the evidence. The co-defendants’ circumstances were materially different, so no unjust disparity arose. Prompt remittal following the guilty plea would not have caused delay, because a pre-sentence report was still required.

3. Had the case been remitted, the Youth Court would have been bound under sections 16 and 17 to make a referral order. The appellant had pleaded guilty and had not previously been dealt with by a court. The Youth Court alone had competence to make that order. A Crown Court judge could not obtain the jurisdiction by exercising a district judge’s general jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeal likewise lacked power to make a referral order.

4. Remittal was no longer appropriate because of the elapsed time and the difficulties already caused. The appellant had complied with the rehabilitation order for four months, had substantial family support, and was not assessed as presenting a risk of reoffending. Applying section 12 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, the court held that, exceptionally, a 12-month conditional discharge was the appropriate disposal despite the offence’s potential seriousness.

5. The rehabilitation order was quashed and replaced with a conditional discharge for 12 months.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal, quashed the rehabilitation order, and substituted a 12-month conditional discharge: [2017] EWCA Crim 2671.
• Central Criminal Court: Following guilty pleas to two counts of arranging to receive and convert criminal property, imposed a 12-month rehabilitation order.
• City of London Magistrates' Court: Sent the appellant for trial to the Central Criminal Court.