Koffi, R. v

A sentence appeal is a review of whether the sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. It is not an occasion to substitute a lawful sentence merely because an alternative disposal might produce an earlier rehabilitation date.

A referral order may be imposed only by the Youth Court. Under Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, the restricted sentencing choices available in the Youth Court may properly inform a Crown Court judge's decision not to remit a first-time young offender. Serious procedural delay is regrettable, but it does not itself make a proportionate sentence unlawful.

When aged 15, Sharon Koffi allowed her bank account to be used to launder £3,600 taken as part of a fraud. She gave her bank card to a co-accused and had been promised £300.

Following substantial delay, she pleaded guilty in the Crown Court. On 12 October 2018, the judge declined to remit her case to the Youth Court and imposed a 12-month youth rehabilitation order with 60 hours' unpaid work. The Youth Offending Team had considered custody inappropriate and doubted that supervision would assist her.

She applied out of time for permission to appeal against sentence. The central issues were whether the case should have been remitted to the Youth Court or instead resulted in a conditional discharge, and whether the youth rehabilitation order was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

1. Leave was granted, but the appeal was dismissed. The court accepted the explanation for the 24-day delay in applying for leave. The sentence was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

2. A referral order could be imposed only by the Youth Court. Dillon [2017] EWCA Crim. 2671 confirmed that neither the Crown Court judge nor this court could make such an order merely by acting as, or being treated as, a District Judge under section 66 of the Courts Act 2003.

3. The judge had been entitled to decline to remit the case. Had it been remitted, section 16 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 would have confined the Youth Court to custody, a referral order or an absolute discharge. The report indicated that custody was unsuitable and that the supervision inherent in a referral order would not assist the appellant. The judge's decision was therefore lawful and appropriate on the facts.

4. The Court of Appeal reviews, rather than resentences afresh. It would not alter a legitimately imposed youth rehabilitation order simply because a conditional discharge might shorten the appellant's rehabilitation period. Although the unpaid-work requirement was more onerous than a referral order and could not have been imposed by the Youth Court, the offence was not trivial: it facilitated a significant fraud.

5. Dillon was fact-specific and did not assist a comparison of the precise sentences. The court criticised the unexplained delay, the allocation of the case with an adult co-defendant, and the earlier failure to seek remittal. Those systemic failings could not be cured through an appeal against a sentence that was otherwise lawful and proportionate.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — granted an extension of time and leave to appeal, then dismissed the appeal against sentence: [2019] EWCA Crim 300.
• Crown Court — on 12 October 2018, declined to remit the case to the Youth Court and imposed a 12-month youth rehabilitation order with 60 hours' unpaid work. No lower-court citation was stated.
• Magistrates' Court — on 11 December 2017, sent the appellant for trial with an adult co-defendant rather than remitting her case to the Youth Court.