Nowocien v District Court In Poznan, Poland

In extradition proceedings, a requested person is a fugitive only where the court is sure that the person was responsible for delay by fleeing, concealing their whereabouts or breaching relevant obligations. Delay caused by the requested person cannot ordinarily support an objection under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003.

Oppression requires more than hardship. Under section 25, a high threshold applies to physical or mental illness, including suicide risk, and the court may ordinarily presume that an EU receiving state will take appropriate protective measures. Article 8 requires a proportionality assessment. There is no requirement of exceptionality, but the public interest in extradition is substantial and weighty.

The appellant faced extradition to Poland in connection with alleged fraudulent invoices created between 1995 and 1997. She had been arrested and detained in Poland, later released on conditional bail, and left Poland in 2012. An arrest warrant and European arrest warrant followed after she failed to notify the Polish court of her change of address.

District Judge Blake ordered extradition on 18 August 2016. The appellant appealed on the grounds that she was not a fugitive, that extradition would be unjust or oppressive because of delay or her physical and mental condition, and that extradition would be disproportionate under article 8 of the ECHR. Fresh medical evidence was admitted. The central issues were whether the statutory bars applied and whether the extradition order remained proportionate.

1. Appeal dismissed. Fresh evidence concerning the appellant’s medical condition was admitted, but it did not alter the result.
2. Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, a person is not entitled to rely on delay for which she was responsible. A finding that a person is a fugitive requires the court to be sure of the relevant facts. The appellant had left Poland in breach of an obligation to notify the Polish court of changes of address. Her belief that the proceedings were time-barred did not remove responsibility for the resulting delay. No exceptional circumstances justified taking that period into account.
3. The concepts of injustice and oppression have distinct primary focuses. Injustice concerns the fairness of the trial, while oppression principally concerns the requested person’s personal circumstances. Oppression is not established merely because extradition would cause more than ordinary hardship. The evidence did not show that delay had caused specific prejudice incapable of fair treatment in Poland, or that the appellant’s medical conditions could not be adequately managed there.
4. Section 25 imposes a high threshold. In a suicide-risk case, the mental condition must remove the capacity to resist the suicidal impulse, and the risk of successful suicide despite appropriate arrangements must be assessed. The court was entitled to presume that Poland would discharge its responsibilities to protect the appellant and manage the risks.
5. Section 21A required a proportionality and human-rights assessment. Article 8 is qualified and contains no test of exceptionality. The constant and weighty public interest in extradition, the seriousness of the alleged offence and the appellant’s responsibility for part of the delay outweighed the interference with her private and family life. The updated medical evidence did not show that she was unfit to stand trial or that extradition was disproportionate.
6. No adjournment or further medical report was ordered. The appeal was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal against the extradition order dismissed; fresh evidence admitted.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Blake ordered extradition on 18 August 2016.