Dacorum Borough Council v Bucknall (aka Acheampong)

Accommodation provided under the full housing duty is not automatically occupied “as a dwelling” for the purposes of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. The question is fact-specific and principally concerns the purpose for which the accommodation is permitted to be occupied. Where interim accommodation is followed by an offer allowing the applicant to remain for an indefinite or potentially lengthy period, the original temporary purpose may be superseded. The accommodation may then constitute the applicant’s dwelling, even though it remains temporary and is provided in performance of the full housing duty. The court must examine the terms of the later offer and the circumstances of continued occupation, rather than the statutory duty alone.

The Council provided Ms Bucknall, a homeless applicant, with temporary accommodation under the interim housing duty in section 188(1) of the Housing Act 1996. After accepting that it owed her the full housing duty under section 193(2), the Council allowed her to remain in the same property pending an offer of alternative accommodation. It later served a notice to quit which lacked the prescribed information required by section 5(1A) of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.

The County Court held that the property was not occupied as a dwelling. The appeal concerned whether, when the notice was served, the accommodation was being provided under the interim or full housing duty and whether it was occupied as a dwelling.

1. Appeal allowed. The notice to quit was deficient because it omitted the prescribed information required by section 5(1A) of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977, if the property was occupied as a dwelling.
2. The interim housing duty under section 188(3) of the Housing Act 1996 ceased when the Council notified its section 184 decision. From 18 September 2014, the Council was performing its full housing duty by allowing Ms Bucknall to remain in suitable accommodation.
3. The full housing duty does not require settled, permanent or secure accommodation. Temporary accommodation may perform that duty without discharging it. The principle that an authority may require a reasonable period to secure accommodation applies where immediate performance is impossible, and did not apply because suitable accommodation was already available.
4. The expressions concerning occupation “as a dwelling” under sections 3 and 5 of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 concern the purpose of the letting or licence. The court normally examines the original purpose, unless a later express or inferred agreement supersedes it.
5. The original licence was overtaken by the Council’s later offer that Ms Bucknall could remain for an indefinite period pending alternative accommodation. The property was provided for an indeterminate and potentially lengthy period, was not subject to the operation of the section 184 investigation, and could have fulfilled the full housing duty if retained permanently. In those circumstances, it was reasonably capable of being treated as her home and was occupied as a dwelling.
6. There is no automatic rule that accommodation provided under the full housing duty is occupied as a dwelling. The decisive inquiry remains the purpose of the continued occupation, particularly the terms accompanying notification of the section 184 decision.

• High Court (Queen's Bench Division): allowed the appeal from the County Court at Watford and concluded that the property was occupied as a dwelling.
• County Court at Watford: ordered possession, holding that Ms Bucknall did not occupy the property as a dwelling.