Vilionis v Vilnius County Court Lithuania & Anor

In extradition proceedings, passage of time will bar extradition under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 only where extradition would be unjust or oppressive. A fugitive generally cannot rely on time passing after departure from the requesting state, except in the most exceptional circumstances.

Article 8 carries a high threshold in extradition cases because of the strong public interest in honouring extradition arrangements and preventing the United Kingdom becoming a safe haven. Mental illness and suicide risk do not ordinarily satisfy section 25 unless the condition removes the person’s capacity to resist suicide, and the effectiveness of preventive measures must also be considered. Proportionality under section 21A is confined to the statutory factors.

The appellant faced two European Arrest Warrants issued by Lithuania. The first concerned an activated suspended sentence for robbery and commercial burglary. The second concerned an accusation of robbery involving a knife.

A District Judge ordered extradition under both warrants. The appellant relied on delay, articles 4 and 8 of the ECHR, mental illness and suicide risk, and proportionality under sections 14, 21, 25 and 21A of the Extradition Act 2003. The appeals also raised whether the appellant was a fugitive when he left Lithuania and whether his trafficking history affected the statutory tests.

1. The appeal concerning EAW 1 was allowed because the appellant had already served the sentence for which extradition was sought.
2. The appeal concerning EAW 2 was dismissed. The District Judge was entitled to revisit the fugitive issue in light of the evidence available at the second hearing. The conclusion that the appellant was a fugitive was open to the judge. The exceptional qualification recognised in Kakis v Government of Cyprus did not apply.
3. Even if the appellant had not been a fugitive, the short period of delay did not make extradition unjust or oppressive. The approach in Gomes v Government of Trinidad and Tobago supported the District Judge’s conclusion.
4. The article 8 challenge failed. The public interest in extradition, mutual confidence between judicial authorities and the seriousness of the alleged offence outweighed the appellant’s personal vulnerability, trafficking history and medical evidence. The high threshold described in Polish Judicial Authority v Celinski, drawing on Norris v Government of the United States of America (No. 2) and HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa, was not met.
5. The section 25 challenge failed. The medical evidence did not show that the appellant’s mental condition removed his capacity to resist suicide. The court also emphasised the relevance of preventive measures and the presumption that a Category 1 state would comply with its Convention obligations. Medical information should accompany a requested person on surrender so that treatment and protective measures can continue.
6. Section 21A(3) permits consideration only of the seriousness of the alleged offence, the likely penalty and the possibility of less coercive measures. The reasoning concerning the use of mutual legal assistance in Puceviciene v German Judicial Authority was correct, although the relevant observations were obiter in that case. The alleged offence was sufficiently serious that extradition would remain proportionate.

Lord Justice Burnett gave the judgment. Mr Justice Sweeney agreed.

1. District Judge: ordered extradition under EAW 1 on 3 November 2015 and under EAW 2 on 2 August 2016.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the appeal concerning EAW 1 because the sentence had been served, and dismissed the appeal concerning EAW 2.