All Leisure Holidays Ltd & Ors, Re Insolvency Act 1986

General consent to electronic delivery may be inferred where a customer provides an email address for booking communications, and the contractual purpose of that address encompasses communications arising from an insolvency. That consent survives administration or liquidation. A separate marketing preference does not negate it.

Where the cost of repeated notices is disproportionate to the benefit obtained, the court may permit a single notice directing creditors to documents on a website, provided they may request hard copies. The court may make such directions applicable to successor office-holders. A prospective application for limited disclosure of a statement of affairs is permissible where the relevant confidential information can be identified in advance.

The administrators of four companies in the All Leisure and Page & Moy groups sought directions in the administrations. They asked to send insolvency communications electronically to customers who had supplied email addresses, to issue a single website notice to creditors, and prospectively to obtain limited disclosure of customer names, addresses and debts in the statements of affairs.

The applications arose against a background of business sales, large numbers of customers and substantial differences between the cost of repeated hard-copy notices and a single website notification. The central issues were whether the customers had generally consented to electronic delivery, whether repeated notices would involve disproportionate expense, and whether commercial sensitivity justified limited disclosure.

1. The applications were granted. Under Rule 12A.10(1) of the Insolvency Rules 1986, customers who had supplied an email address for booking-related communications had given sufficient general consent to electronic delivery. The relevant booking terms, privacy provisions and the purpose for which the address was supplied showed that consent extended to information concerning the booking and consequences of the insolvency. It continued during administration or liquidation.

2. Website and marketing tick boxes did not withdraw that consent. They concerned marketing communications and information sharing, whereas the specific booking terms governed booking-related communications. Electronic delivery could also be made to travel agents where the agent’s email address had been supplied, with the agent responsible for passing on the communication.

3. Under Rule 12A.13(1), the expense of sending notices repeatedly to more than 14,000 customers and other creditors would be disproportionate to the benefit. A single notice stating that relevant documents would be available on a website, with a right to request hard copies under Rules 12A.13(1)(c) and 12A.13(4), was therefore authorised. The direction could apply to successor office-holders, including liquidators.

4. A prospective application under Rule 2.30 of the Insolvency Rules 1986 was permissible where the part of the statement of affairs likely to require protection could be identified before the statement was received. Disclosure of customer details would prejudice the administration because the information was commercially sensitive and protected by confidentiality provisions in the business sale. That justified limited disclosure.

5. Possible concerns under the Data Protection Act 1998 and concerns about media approaches did not independently justify the order. The data-protection exemption for disclosure required by an enactment was likely to apply, and the commercial-sensitivity ground was sufficient.