Parveen v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

The assessment of “very significant obstacles to integration” requires a broad evaluative judgment. The decision-maker should assess the obstacles actually relied upon and decide whether they are very significant, without adding glosses to the language of the Immigration Rules.

An applicant must provide sufficiently particularised evidence. Bare assertions about lost connections or lack of support do not require elaborate investigation by the decision-maker.

A claim under article 8 outside the Rules must be considered independently. Its success ordinarily depends on detailed evidence about the applicant’s circumstances, rather than extensive citation of authority.

The appellant, a Pakistani national, entered the United Kingdom with limited leave as the spouse of a British citizen. She did not seek further leave before its expiry and applied to remain more than 13 years later. The Secretary of State rejected her claims under the partner and private-life routes of the Immigration Rules and under article 8 outside the Rules.

The Upper Tribunal refused permission to apply for judicial review. The appellant appealed on the grounds that the Secretary of State had inadequately assessed whether she faced very significant obstacles to integration in Pakistan and had failed properly to determine her claim under article 8 outside the Rules.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The appellant had not shown that the Secretary of State’s decision was arguably unlawful.

2. The concept of integration requires a broad evaluative judgment about whether a person can participate in the society of the country of return, operate there on a day-to-day basis and develop human relationships within a reasonable time. The expression “very significant obstacles” sets an elevated threshold, but further verbal glosses are of little assistance. The decision-maker must assess the obstacles relied upon and decide whether they are very significant.

3. The appellant’s bare assertion that she had lost all connections with Pakistan and had nobody there to support her was insufficient. She supplied no particulars about her former life, family, friends, work, qualifications or the circumstances in which contact had been lost. The Secretary of State was therefore entitled to find that she had not demonstrated very significant obstacles for the purposes of paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Immigration Rules.

4. The Secretary of State had expressly considered whether exceptional circumstances justified leave under article 8 outside the Rules. In a judicial review concerning such a claim, the court’s function extends beyond conventional review criteria and requires its own assessment. Loose use of public-law terminology does not, however, necessarily reveal a material misdirection.

5. The article 8 claim also failed for want of evidence. A properly informed assessment could require evidence about whether the appellant would previously have qualified for further leave, why she failed to apply, whether she still met the substantive spouse requirements, and what disruption would result from applying abroad. Those matters were considerations rather than mandatory conditions.

6. Had the appellant established those matters, she might have had a very strong claim. It could be disproportionate to require departure solely to correct a venial administrative error where an application from abroad was certain to succeed. That possibility could not determine an inadequately evidenced application.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Dismissed the appeal from the refusal of permission to apply for judicial review: [2018] EWCA Civ 932.
2. Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): UTJ Canavan refused permission to apply for judicial review following an oral hearing. UTJ Blum had previously refused permission on the papers.
3. Secretary of State: Refused the appellant’s application for leave to remain under the Immigration Rules and article 8 outside the Rules.