Hinds, R v

Evidence of jury deliberations will ordinarily not be received after verdict. The rule protects the integrity and finality of collective jury decision-making. A departure is confined to rare cases, such as a complete repudiation of the jury’s duty to deliberate.

A document described as agreed facts is conclusive under section 10(1) only where it clearly admits the relevant fact. An agreement that an officer prepared a transcript does not, without more, admit that the transcript accurately records the words spoken. Post-verdict complaints from a dissenting juror will not justify an investigation unless, in context, they provide a proper basis for questioning the safety of the conviction.

After a jury trial at the Central Criminal Court, Nyrome Hinds was convicted of attempted murder, possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life, and robbery. He received life imprisonment for attempted murder, with a minimum term of 15½ years, and concurrent determinate sentences on the remaining counts.

A single judge refused leave to appeal. On renewal, the applicant relied principally on post-verdict emails from a juror alleging that other jurors had misunderstood directions, treated his silence as decisive, and rejected an asserted agreed fact concerning CCTV audio. He also criticised one aspect of the summing-up. The central issue was whether the communications justified an investigation or otherwise rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. The renewed application for leave to appeal was refused. The convictions were safe, there was no arguable ground of appeal, and there was no reason to direct an investigation by the Criminal Cases Review Commission.
2. The court followed Mirza [2004] 1 AC 1118. The ordinary rule prevents the court from receiving evidence of statements, opinions, arguments or votes in jury deliberations after verdict. It serves to protect jurors from outside interference and criticism. The recognised qualification is exceptionally narrow, exemplified by a jury wholly abandoning deliberation through a coin toss or comparable device. The present allegations did not approach that category. Adams [2007] 1 Cr.App.R 34 concerned alleged pre-trial knowledge of the defendant by a juror and was materially different.
3. The juror had been directed, and given written guidance, to raise concerns during the trial or through an usher. Her failure to do so while the jury was deliberating, coupled with her own assertion that she had formed a view from the beginning of the trial, supported the court’s conclusion that the emails were post-verdict dissent rather than a basis to investigate alleged disregard of directions.
4. Under Criminal Justice Act 1967, section 10(1), a formal admission is conclusive against the party making it. The document in this case established only that an officer had made a transcript of the CCTV audio. It did not unequivocally admit that the words in the transcript had been spoken. The jury could therefore reach its own view of the recording. In any event, the alleged point was not decisive in light of the strong circumstantial evidence.
5. The complaint about the summing-up had not been raised at trial and created no arguable doubt about safety.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction refused: [2018] EWCA Crim 833.
• Single judge — Openshaw J refused leave to appeal against conviction on the papers.
• Central Criminal Court — on 7 June 2017, a jury convicted the applicant of attempted murder, possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life, and robbery. On 25 July 2017, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for attempted murder and concurrent sentences for the other offences.