SA (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Private life developed while immigration status is precarious attracts little weight under section 117B(5), but that guidance is not inflexible. In an exceptional case, particularly strong features of private life may outweigh it.

The assessment of very significant obstacles to integration under paragraph 276ADE is distinct from the Article 15(c) assessment, although Article 15(c) circumstances may provide a relevant starting point. Integration requires a broad evaluative judgment about the person’s ability to understand and participate in life in the receiving society. Where personal circumstances do not create particular vulnerability, Article 15(c) requires a real risk arising solely from presence amid sufficiently high indiscriminate violence.

The appellant, an Afghan national who arrived in the United Kingdom aged 14, appealed against the refusal of his claims for refugee status, humanitarian protection and protection under Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal on 24 August 2015. Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge MacDonald upheld that decision on 9 March 2016.

The appeal concerned the application of section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules, and Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. The central questions were whether the appellant’s private life attracted greater weight because it had developed during childhood, whether he faced very significant obstacles to integration in Afghanistan, and whether he qualified for humanitarian protection because of indiscriminate violence in Kabul.

Appeal dismissed. Simon LJ gave the judgment, with Baker LJ and Underhill LJ agreeing.

1. Under section 117B(5) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, private life established while immigration status is precarious should receive little weight. Following Rhuppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 58, the provision supplies normative guidance but does not impose a straight-jacket. In an exceptional case, particularly strong features of private life may justify greater weight. The appellant’s private life did not have those features. The First-tier Tribunal had properly considered the statutory framework.
2. The question whether there are very significant obstacles to integration under paragraph 276ADE is distinct from the question under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. The Article 15(c) assessment may nevertheless be relevant and may properly provide a starting point. The First-tier Tribunal considered the two issues separately.
3. Integration requires a broad evaluative judgment. The relevant question is whether the individual can understand and participate in the receiving society, operate there on a day-to-day basis, and build relationships giving substance to private or family life. The tribunal’s reasoning must be read in substance and not with excessive technical scrutiny, as explained in Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813. The First-tier Tribunal was entitled to rely on the appellant’s health, personality, social skills, capacity and connection with Kabul in finding no very significant obstacles.
4. Under Article 15(c), where personal circumstances do not specifically affect the claimant, the claimant must show that presence in the relevant area alone creates a real risk from indiscriminate violence. Personal circumstances may reduce the level of violence required. Applying Elgafaji (Case C-465/07), the First-tier Tribunal was entitled to find that the appellant’s relative youth did not establish the required particular vulnerability and that he did not meet the test for humanitarian protection.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — [2019] EWCA Civ 53: appeal dismissed.
• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) — Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge MacDonald upheld the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on 9 March 2016.
• First-tier Tribunal — Judge Archer dismissed the appellant’s appeal on 24 August 2015.