Woodward & Ors, R. v

A break in jury deliberations, however lengthy, does not automatically make a criminal trial unfair or a conviction unsafe. The question is fact sensitive and requires an overall assessment of whether the jury retained a fair opportunity to assess the evidence and discharge its function.

Relevant matters include the quality of the summing-up, the material available in retirement, the time between summing-up and verdict, any contemporaneous application to discharge the jury, signs of jury difficulty, and whether differentiated verdicts show careful assessment. A judge should give prudent assistance after a substantial interruption, including a reminder that the jury may seek a further reminder of evidence. Since Juries Act 1974, separation after retirement is permissible subject to appropriate safeguards.

Four appellants were convicted of murder at the Crown Court at Oxford on 2 October 2018 and sentenced to life imprisonment. The trial, initially expected to finish before mid-July, overran because of a series of delays.

During deliberations, the jury separated twice for pre-booked holidays, first from 8 to 29 August and then from 5 to 27 September. On their return after the first break, the judge referred them to their written materials and invited requests for reminders of evidence. After the second break, he did not repeat that invitation. The appellants contended that the interruptions and the passage of time made the trial unfair and their convictions unsafe.

1. The appeals were dismissed. There is no general rule that a particular period of separation during deliberations necessarily makes a trial unfair or a conviction unsafe. The trial judge must decide, on the facts, whether the point has been reached at which the case should be withdrawn from the jury.

2. The governing question is whether the jury had a reasonable opportunity to retain and assess the evidence, within a fair process. The court identified six material considerations: the quality of the summing-up; the material available to the jury; the gap between summing-up and verdict; any application to discharge the jury; indications of the jury's ability to perform its task; and the character of the verdicts.

3. The court followed the fact-sensitive approach in R v A, Heppenstall and Potter [2007] EWCA Crim 2485, but distinguished its outcome. In that case, disruption was aggravated by a deficient summing-up. Here, the summing-up was clear, the jury had written directions, routes to verdict, agreed admissions and other documentary material, and they had previously been told they could request reminders of evidence.

4. After the second break, it would have been prudent for the judge again to remind the jury that they could ask for help with any evidence. However, the omission did not render the process unfair. The jury had already deliberated for eight days before the second break; there was no sign that they could not carry out their task; and their differing verdicts across ten defendants and several charges showed discriminating consideration of the evidence.

5. Although the cumulative six weeks away from the case, particularly the second break, were unsatisfactory, the strong prosecution case and the safeguards available to the jury meant that the verdicts were safe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed the appeals against conviction: [2019] EWCA Crim 1002.
• Crown Court at Oxford convicted the four appellants of murder on 2 October 2018 and imposed life sentences.