Elvis Skeete v R

A jury note raising concern that jurors’ personal experience may have influenced deliberations does not automatically require discharge of the jury. The trial judge has a range of reasonable responses, including directions or focused questions, assessed in the circumstances and by reference to the terms of the note.

A vague and imprecise concern, without a direct assertion that experience affected the verdict, may be adequately addressed by requiring each juror to confirm adherence to legal directions, the juror’s oath and an evidence-based verdict. The appellate court should not substitute its view for that of the trial judge. A pause in deliberations is not itself an irregularity where the jury was told to stop deliberating and had no reason to discuss the case during the pause.

The appellant was convicted of rape at the Crown Court sitting at Isleworth on 26 January 2022 and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment on 11 March 2022. He appealed by leave.

The appeal concerned whether a jury note about two jurors’ personal experience of sexual assault and rape required the whole jury to be discharged; whether questions subsequently put to the jurors were sufficient; whether the judge wrongly discharged a juror with work commitments; and whether a five-day interruption in deliberations rendered the majority verdict unsafe.

The court dismissed the appeal and held that the jury’s majority verdict was safe.

1. Discharge for personal difficulty. The Criminal Practice Directions confer a broad discretion, exercised in the interests of justice, where a juror faces an unexpected professional or personal difficulty. Section 16(1) of the Juries Act 1974 implicitly permits discharge of a juror and continuation with a reduced jury in shorter cases. The judge’s decision to discharge the juror with work commitments was a case-management decision within the reasonable range of responses.
2. Interruption in deliberations. The gap between 20 and 26 January was not itself an irregularity. The jury had been told to cease deliberating, knew that the court could not sit, and would have understood that they were not to discuss the case before returning. No further direction was necessary. The circumstances differed materially from those in Woodward and others [2019] EWCA Crim 1002.
3. Apparent bias. The relevant question was whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility or danger that the jury would be biased, applying the approach identified in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67. The note made no direct assertion of bias and described the concern in vague and imprecise terms. The mere fact that jurors had disclosed personal experiences did not demonstrate bias or require discharge of the entire jury.
4. Adequacy of the response. The appellate court had to consider whether the judge’s approach fell outside the range of reasonable responses, without substituting its own judgment. The judge was entitled to ask each remaining juror whether they had followed the legal directions, remained faithful to the oath and could decide the case only on the evidence. In the circumstances, the questions sufficiently dispelled any real danger of bias. The court distinguished the explicit racial-bias circumstances in Sander v UK (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 44 and applied the contrasting approach illustrated by Gregory v United Kingdom (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 577.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2022] EWCA Crim 1511, the appeal against conviction was dismissed and the jury’s majority verdict was held safe.
2. Crown Court at Isleworth: The appellant was convicted of rape on 26 January 2022 and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment on 11 March 2022.