Gynane, R. v

Discharge of a juror requires an evident need, which may arise from actual or apparent bias. Jurors may bring life experience to their deliberations; personal experience, moral views or searching questions do not by themselves establish bias. The trial judge must make a fact-specific assessment under the fair-minded and informed observer test, taking account of the timing and context of the juror’s conduct, the juror’s understanding of the issues and the effect of clear judicial directions. On appeal, that assessment can be disturbed only if it falls outside the range of reasonable responses. Genuine questions about evidence and legal guidance, even where they reflect concern about drug abuse, may therefore be compatible with an open mind and a fair trial.

The appellant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court before HHJ Foster and a jury of murder and causing grievous bodily harm with intent. His case included diminished responsibility and issues concerning drug dependence.

During the trial, a juror sent notes containing questions about diminished responsibility, addiction, voluntary drug use and violence. The appellant applied for the juror to be discharged on grounds of actual or apparent bias. The trial judge refused the applications, gave repeated directions requiring the jury to keep open minds and decide the case only on the evidence, and later convicted the appellant. The central issue was whether those decisions were outside the range of reasonable responses and rendered the convictions unsafe.

The court rejected the grounds of appeal and dismissed the appeal. The convictions were safe.

1. Applicable principles. A trial judge may discharge a juror only where there is an evident need to do so. Such a need may arise from actual or apparent bias. Jurors bring their life experiences with them, and that is one of the strengths of the jury system. Where life experience is said to have caused bias, the test is whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the relevant facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias, applying the approach in Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357.
2. The assessment is fact-specific and is primarily for the trial judge. On appeal, the court cannot interfere unless the decision was outwith the range of reasonable responses, as illustrated by LS [2009] EWCA Crim 104.
3. The timing and context of the notes were important. Note B followed the appellant’s evidence about his drug use and was relevant to whether that use was voluntary or involuntary. Note C followed psychiatric evidence and was relevant to the jury’s assessment of that evidence. The juror had not yet received detailed legal directions and had no identified legal or specialist training. It was therefore wrong to assume that apparent moral views about diminished responsibility reflected a fully informed and closed mind.
4. The judge was entitled to accept the juror’s answers in chambers, including his explanation that he was seeking guidance and wished to avoid raising irrelevant or inaccurate matters. The questions could properly be viewed as genuine requests for information rather than concluded views. The judge was also entitled to find that the juror could comply with repeated directions to decide the case only on the evidence. The circumstances differed from Pouladin-Kari [2013] EWCA Crim 158, where the juror had expressed concern about his own ability to disregard professional knowledge.
5. There was no clear basis for inferring that the juror had been an interim foreman or had exercised special influence over the other jurors. No other juror had expressed concern. The judge was entitled to refuse both applications, and the convictions were accordingly upheld.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Appeal against conviction dismissed. The court held that the trial judge’s refusal to discharge the juror was within the range of reasonable responses and that the convictions were safe: [2020] EWCA Crim 1348.
• Central Criminal Court: Following trial before HHJ Foster and a jury, the appellant was convicted of murder and causing grievous bodily harm with intent.